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This history goes forward and goes backward, as occasion calls.
Nimble center, circumference elastic you must have.
Herman Melville'
'[C]ollectively' ... is the smudgiest word in the English language.
Frederic Maitland2
History is crucial in identifying groups that warrant particular legal
protection.3 Yet it is common to try to cut off the past so that the future
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1. H. MELV=LE, PiERRE oR, THE Amsiurrms ch. 8 (1852).
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Newnham College (1903), in MAnlkn: SELECTED EssAYs 222, 236 (H.D. Hazeltine, G. Lapsley,
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3. The first broad elaboration of specific protection for the rights of minorities as
minorities occurred in treaties, international law instruments, and court opinions following
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can be approached with unbounded optimism. People in the United States
particularly seem to assume that the past has emphatically passed and is not
prologue. Still, it is worthy of notice when a majority of the justices of the
United States Supreme Court seem willfully blind to the burdens of the past.
This essay sketches the profoundly ahistorical approach of judges today to
precisely those groups who most obviously warrant special judicial concern
if there is to be any special judicial solicitude on the basis of past wrongs.
There have been times, such as during the civil rights struggles of the
1870s and the 1960s, when minority groups attempted to force the United
States and its courts to deliver on glittering historical promises. This essay
describes judges who starkly choose the patina of neutrality over the demands
of equality. Today, leading judges opt for a static, abstract ideal over what
is complex, contextual, and more real historically.
The pleasant judicial assumption that all citizens of the United States
have reached parity now extends even to racial matters. Garbed in purported
neutrality, a majority of the justices go so far as to suggest that the federal
constitution and their judicial oaths actually compel them to reject special
solicitude for dispossessed and victimized groups. It is striking that when
English judges struggle to define the rights of minority groups, they also
display a propensity to ignore discomforting history. All these Anglo-Amer-
ican judges appear unaware of the contemporary struggles of their transat-
lantic counterparts-to say nothing of their neighbors, other countries, and
international legal instruments-to define and protect minority rights.
This essay's criticism of judicial ahistoricism differs from the relatively
commonplace critique of "law office history," though surely there is validity
to that criticism as well.4 Moreover, this essay argues neither that what has
come before should automatically continue, 5 nor that the past reveals a line
of clear, inescapable development. In discussing legal claims rooted in the
special histories and perspectives of members of discrete and insular minor-
ities, no claim is made that such claims should always prevail. But memory
does reveal past burdens, as well as the richness of resources available to
deal with our troublesome heritage. The diverse backgrounds of the groups
with which we define ourselves and are defined help constitute the context
a judge ought to consider even when-perhaps particularly when-legal
World War I. For recent discussion underscoring the importance of history and tradition in
definitions of group rights in international law, see N. LERNER, GROUP RIaHTS Am) DiscPiun-
INATION IN INTERNATONAL LAW ch.2 (forthcoming, 1990); Dinstein, Discrimination and Inter-
national Human Rights, 15 Is. YRBK. Hum. RTS. 11 (1985) [hereinafter Discrimination];
Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INr'L & Corn. L.Q. 102
(1976) [hereinafter Collective Human Rights]. For specific background, see also the essays in
RiGHTs OF PEOPLES (J. Crawford ed. 1988) and my article in 1 Is. YRBK. HUM. RTs. (1971).
4. See, e.g., C. MILLER, Tim SuPRME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); Wiecek,
Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W.L.
REv. 227 (1988); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 119.
5. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (assumption of ancient roots for laws
proscribing homosexuality used to justify ban on consensual adult sodomy).
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arguments challenge complacent faith in the sweeping generalities of the legal
status quo.
I. D.EFNG SPECIAL GROUPS: HISTORY AND INVOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION
This essay discusses important judicial decisions about basic social units.
It wrestles with legal claims that involve the definition of families, tribes,
and racial, ethnic, national and religious groups. In combination but also in
conflict, these relationships define who we are. Such groups often are
bunched together under the rubric of "involuntary associations." 6 To call
them "involuntary associations," however, is to lose definitional precision
and to tend to deprecate the vital, albeit varied, importance of such collec-
tivities in constituting individual identities. Still, it seems important to
distinguish these "innate," or "immutable" group characteristics from the
"voluntary associations" that so concerned Frederic Maitland and other
leading legal lights who debated corporate personality incessantly from the
1880s through the 1920s. Unlike "voluntary associations," moreover, there
has been relatively little scholarly attention to the problematic nature of
these so-called "natural" associations. As we will see, in the hands of Anglo-
American judges committed to seeing only how individuals play life's game,
these fundamental social groupings have become virtual wild-cards.
Only eighteen years after the formal abolition of slavery, at the moment
when Jim Crow began to dominate the South, the United States Supreme
Court declared it high time that the former slave "take[] the rank of mere
citizen, and cease] to be the special favorite of the law."' 7 Again today, and
again for the sake of presumed equality, the Court cuts off consideration
of past racial wrongs and their continuing ramifications. The Court's own
6. Despite recent scholarly debate about freedom of association and the role of voluntary
associations, an independent freedom of association right seldom is defined concretely. For a
review and commentary on these topics, see, e.g., Soifer, Toward a Generalized Notion of the
Right to Form or Join an Association: An Essay For Tom Emerson, 38 CAsE W. REs. L.
Rav. 641 (1987-88) (arguing for an independent freedom of association right); Soifer, Sobeloff
Lecture: Freedom of Association: Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48 MD. L.
REv. 350 (1989) (discussing recent constitutional decisions); A. Soifer, Fictions We Must Feign
and Maitland's Simple Truth (draft available) (essay discussing Anglo-American debate in early
twentieth century about corporate personality). In international law, despite frequent references
to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association, it still seems, as it did in
1971, that these rights "have yet to attain any meaningful concretization." Dinstein, Discrim-
ination, supra note 3, at 20.
Legal scholars have paid less attention to so-called "involuntary associations," an inartful
characterization used to distinguish the groups we are born into, and which we may not be
able to leave even if we wish to do so, from allegedly "voluntary associations." Kathleen
Sullivan offers a lucid introduction to some basic problems posed by "intermediate groups"-
those affiliations that exist somewhere between individuals and the comprehensive state-for
the currently fashionable strand of "republicanism," in which she mentions the tendency to
overstate the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE
L.J. 1713, 1714 (1988).
7. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (invalidating Civil Rights Act of 1875 that
prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations).
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complicity in legitimating segregation has been expunged." Now everyone is
presumed formally equal, unencumbered by the past. All groups-voluntary
and involuntary, white and black, corporations and Indian tribes-compete
fairly in the political marketplace. Indeed, it would violate judicial neutrality
to show special concern even for a group with a long history of being
victimized. Special concern, in fact, may be invalid, since it denies equality
in the great race of life.
The apparently irrepressible controversy over "Who is a Jew?" vividly
illustrates how distinctions purportedly based on voluntary entrance and exit
are not conclusive in determining whether one is or is not a member even
of an "involuntary" association. To be Jewish may mean to be part of a
family, tribe, religion, race, ethnic group, nation, culture, linguistic group,
minority, or perhaps all of the above and more. Moreover, what often seems
largely a symbolic issue in litigation today still implicates two additional
basic questions: "Who wants to know?" and "Why?" These inquiries ought
to translate directly into concern for historical context. In the years imme-
diately after the Nazi Nuremburg laws, for example, the idea of neutrality
in immigration quotas to the United States-the State Department's adamant
refusal to give Jews "special treatment"-serves as a horrible example of
why context is needed in dealing with the identification of and with invol-
untary groups. 9
8. Constitutional decisions legitimating the entire apparatus of racism are legion. The
classic survey is L. MILLER, THE PErrIToNERs: TiE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO (1966). Helpful recent accounts of specific decisions that
upheld, and even required segregation, as in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908),
include C. LOFOREN, THE PLEssY CASE: A LEGAL HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987); Kennedy,
Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86
COLUm. L. REv. 1622 (1986).
9. See, e.g., A. MORSE, WrILE Six MILLION DrID: A CHRONICLE OF AMERICAN APATHY
128-131 (1968). With hindsight, it is eerie to read Ernest Barker's 1934 statement that:
[E]ach society is also a plurality. It is a rich web of contained groups-religious and
educational, professional and occupational; some for pleasure and some for profit;
some based on neighborhood and some on some other affinity; all dyed by national
colour, and yet all (or most of them) with the capacity, and the instinct, for
associating themselves with similar groups in other national societies, and thus
emerging into some form of international connection.
E. Barker, "Introduction" to his translation of 0. GIrERu, NATURAL LAw A"o a THEORY
OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800 xxiii (1934, 1958 ed.). Cf. E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
a SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 26-38 (W. Moll trans. 1975 ed.) (contrasting languishing genetic
associations-clan, family, house community-with flourishing associations based on "con-
scious human activity").
For an English summary of the latest effort by the Israeli Supreme Court to come to
grips with the recurrent and vexed question of "Who Is A Jew?" see Landau, "The Messianic
Jews," Jerusalem Post, Jan. 3, 1990, at 5. (This decision, Beresford v. Minister of the Interior
(H.C. 265/87), rejected the purported Jewish identity, for purposes of invoking Israel's Law
of Return, of a group who said they were observant Jews who also recognized the divinity of
Jesus Christ. None of the Justices contested the group's historical claim that they followed
the tradition of Jewish sects from the time of the Second Temple.) Justice Barak argued that,
"The court was concerned with the position today, and not 2,000 years ago." Id. Apparently
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We begin with a brief sketch of the origins and historical context of the
idea that arose in the late 1930s that certain "discrete and insular minorities"
ought to receive special judicial scrutiny. By way of contrast, decisions today
suggest that in their enthusiasm for a world of free individuals without any
past, judges have begun to resemble those "most unlearned of learned men"
whom Maitland described as "rigorous logicians, afraid of no conclusion
that was implicit in their premises." 10 The recent, extremely parsimonious
approach of the United States Supreme Court to "natural" groupings such
as family, tribe, and racial, ethnic, and national identities demonstrates that
these categories are neither natural nor neutral. Judges themselves play active
roles in establishing and legitimating criteria that define involuntary groups.
Yet many of the most distinguished judges in the United States, and to an
extent Great Britain as well, seem blithely unaware that "no man is himself,
he is the sum of his past. There is no such thing really as 'was' because the
past is.""
II. DiscEmTE AND INSULAR MINORITIES
A. Equality: "The Usual Last Resort of Constitutional Arguments"
In his infamous opinion for a United States Supreme Court majority in
Buck v. Bell,'2 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. seized the opportunity to
indulge his eugenic beliefs by upholding the sterilization of a young woman
who, it was alleged, was feeble minded.'3 That holding, and the accompanying
apercu that "three generations of imbeciles are enough,"' 4 are sufficiently
no one noticed irony in handing down this decision on Christmas Day, 1989. For a good
survey of the Israeli Supreme Court's previous struggles with such questions, see Maoz, Who
is a Jew?, 35 MmsmR1d 11 (June/July, 1989).
10. F.W. MAsrAND, 2 SocLAL ENGLAND 476-89 (1894), in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF F.W.
MArnAND 477-96 (1911), also available in SELECTED HisToRiCAL EssAYs OF F. W. MAITAND
126 (H.M. Cam ed. 1957). Maitland referred to English law developing into an occult science
"under the fostering care" of the Inns of Court in the late Middle Ages, when "[n]ovel
principles could not be admitted until they were disguised in some antique garb." Id.
11. FAULKNER IN THE UNIvERsrry 84 (J. Blotner & F. Gwynn eds. 1965).
12. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Justice Brandeis joined the majority; only Justice Butler
dissented, without opinion.
13. Carrie Buck was an 18-year-old white inmate of Virginia's Colony for Epileptics and
Feeble Minded. She was already the mother of an illegitimate child when Superintendent Bell
began proceedings to have her sterilized. Stephen Jay Gould discussed this case and the eugenics
movement generally in THE MisEAstRa OF MAN (1981). Gould also detailed the discovery
nearly 50 years later that there actually were no imbeciles in Carrie Buck's family. Gould,
Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 331 (1985), reprinted in S.J. GOULD, THE
FLAmNo's Sanx. 306 (1985).
14. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Holmes asserted that "experience has shown
that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc." Id. at
206. The particular form of the greater-includes-the-lesser-power argument that Holmes favored
generally was: if "the public -welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives," it would
be "strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for lesser
sacrifices," particularly if the public wished to "prevent being swamped with incompetence"
by those "manifestly unfit." Id. at 207.
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appalling to merit notice. But it is Holmes's reference to equal protection
as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments"' 5 that requires brief
consideration here. What led Holmes to say this?
We may think of numerous overlapping answers, of course. They include
Holmes's inability to resist a well-turned phrase; his love of judicial ma-
chismo, including his frequent embrace of arbitrariness; his customary desire
to provoke; and his interest in denigrating what appeared to be a sympathetic
claim made by Carrie Buck's lawyer. But there is another significant reason:
the forgotten, aggressive use of equal protection by the activist Supreme
Court of Holmes's time.
It is relatively well-known that during the 1920s the Court vigorously
invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate
numerous state laws. Justices Holmes and Brandeis generally dissented from
what they considered anti-democratic judicial intrusions against the will of
popularly elected, often progressive, legislatures. 6 What has not been much
noticed, however, is that for many decades, and most emphatically in the
1920s when William Howard Taft was Chief Justice, the Supreme Court
delighted to use Equal Protection as a weapon for similar purposes.
Truax v. Corrigan7 exemplifies the phenomenon. In 1913, the Arizona
legislature passed a statute to protect labor unions. Arizona law would no
longer consider peaceful picketing and circulation of leaflets to be unlawful
per se, although federal courts and many state courts readily enjoined such
union activity. In Arizona, peaceful union activity could no longer be
enjoined, unless an injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable injury.
The Arizona Supreme Court upheld this new law, claiming that the law was
simply a change in the rules of evidence. The Arizona legislature simply
eliminated a "conclusive presumption." They did not deprive employers of
vested property rights.'
15. Id. at 208.
16. Their famous dissents are collected and discussed in many places. The best sources
include F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND TiHE SUPREME COURT (1938); S. KONEFSKY,
THE LEGACY OF HoLMEs AND BRANDEIS (1956). But Holmes and Brandeis did not always dissent
from the Court's invocations of substantive due process. For example, both joined in striking
down the Kansas Industrial Court Act, which provided for mandatory arbitration in labor
disputes, Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1922) and
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267 U.S. 552 (1925), as well as in
the Court's use of substantive due process to invalidate Oregon's attack on private schools,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
17. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
18. The crucial decision in the Arizona Supreme Court was Truax v. Bisbee Local No.
380, Cooks' and Waiters' Union, 171 P. 121, 125 (1918). Justice Cunningham proclaimed that
Truax had no vested property right in doing his normal amount of business and that he could
not get an injunction against the boycott union members urged through peaceful picketing
and leafletting. Moreover, the Court held, even if the union defendants were insolvent as
Truax alleged, and a damages remedy therefore was not a realistic option, "the matter of
financial worth does not limit the [Arizona] constitutional right to speak, write, and publish
on all subjects." Id. at 127. In Truax v. Corrigan, 20 Ariz. 7, 176 P. 570 (1918), the Arizona
Court held that its decision in Bisbee Local No. 380 did not contravene the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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Chief Justice Taft held that Arizona's attempt to protect unions violated
the equal protection clause of the, federal constitution.1 9 The fourteenth
amendment "was intended to secure equality of protection," Taft wrote for
the majority with a Hobbesian echo, "not only for all but against all
similarly situated." 20 The government had an affirmative obligation to pro-
vide protection to all against all. "Indeed," Taft proclaimed, "protection is
not protection" unless the state meets this equal obligation to everyone. 2' In
considering all participants in the marketplace to be "similarly situated,"
Taft followed mainstream equal protection doctrine. Judges had used the
equality argument for decades to invalidate social and economic legislation
they perceived to be "class legislation. '" 2 It was precisely this aggressive use
of equal protection that made the concept of judicial enforcement of equality
a target worthy of special ridicule for Holmes. And Holmes's facile dismissal
19. This was William Truax's second notable trip to the United States Supreme Court.
In 1915, the Court upheld William Truax's standing as an employer of aliens and used his
case to strike down an Arizona constitutional initiative that had required all employers of
more than five workers to employ at least 80 percent "qualified electors of native-born citizens
of the United States or some sub-division thereof." Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). One
wonders if William Truax had secret backing for his legal journeys from his "English Kitchen"
eatery in Bisbee to Washington, D.C., but it is hardly surprising that nativism permeated the
union's subsequent claim that Truax was unfair to labor. See, e.g., the pamphlet vilifying
Truax in the 1916 labor dispute, reprinted in Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, Cooks' and
Waiters' Union, 171 P. 121, 122 (1918). It would probably be illuminating to trace the roles
of the actors in the two Truax decisions in the intervening, infamous Bisbee deportation of
July 1917, when leading citizens rounded up hundreds of miners, forced them onto boxcars
at gunpoint, and shipped them to the New Mexico desert. Federal courts held that this vigilante
action did not constitute a federal crime. See U.S. v. Wheeler, 254 F. 611 (9th Cir. 1918),
aff'd, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
20. 257 U.S. at 333. Justices Holmes, Pitney, Clarke, and Brandeis dissented. Taft's
view of equal protection included an affirmative obligation of the state to provide protection:
"It emphasizes the additional sanctity of a right which the clause has confirmed beyond the
requirement of due process." Id. And equal protection would be denied by "immunity granted
to a class, however limited, having the effect to deprive another class, however limited, of a
personal or property right" just as clearly "as if the immunity were in favor of, or the
deprivation of right permitted worked against, a larger class." Id. Holmes attacked the
majority for falling prey to "the dangers of a delusive exactness in the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment," and explained, "There is nothing that I more deprecate than the
use of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the making of social experiments that an
important part of the community desires." Id. at 342, 344. Brandeis's lengthy dissent offered
an essay on the history of labor relations and pointed out, "It is of the nature of our law
that it has not dealt with man in general, but with him in relationships." Id. at 355.
21. Id. at 333. Both the Bisbee deportations and Truax v. Corrigan contributed to the
Arizona reality experienced by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor-a world, as we
will see, they tend to perceive as natural, neutral, and fair.
22. In Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Railway v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 153, 165 (1897), for
example, Justice Brewer invalidated a Texas statute that allowed claimants against railroads
up to ten dollars in attorneys fees, because to single out railroad corporations was to "make
the protecting clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment a mere rope of sand" and to fail "the
constitutional obligation of equal protection." For further examples and an insightful discussion
of early equal protection doctrine, see Kay, Equal Protection in the Supreme Court, 1883-
1903, 29 BurnAIo L. Rva. 661 (1980).
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of equality claims in 1927 generally carried the day, and most of the next
decade.
B. April 25, 1938: A Footnote in the Sands of Time
The spring of 1938 undid Holmes's consignment of equality claims to
the dustbin of constitutional history. The Supreme Court began to suggest
a new approach to prejudice and discrimination against groups. Because of
two judicial pronouncements on April 25, 1938, probably the only more
significant date in American law in this century is May 17, 1954, when the
Supreme Court unanimously invalidated official segregation in public schools
in Brown v. Board of Education.Y Unlike Brown, however, the judicial
handiwork that day attracted virtually no public attention.Y The two key
decisions involved obscure plaintiffs and seemed to decide only issues of
"lawyers' law." Yet these two cases marked a watershed. A new majority
of the Court struggled to reduce activism by federal judges on the one hand,
while encouraging judicial intervention in a select category of cases on the
other. The Court's approach that cloudy spring day has dominated consti-
tutional discourse in the United States ever since.
The first decision, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,2 need not detain us long.
(It remains part of virtually every American law student's nightmarish
introduction to the perplexity of trying to "think like a lawyer" in the
peculiar American federal judicial system.)2 The day's other crucial judicial
pronouncement suggested that the federal constitution might compel judges
to play a special, activist role when they review discrimination against
"discrete and insular minorities." Ironically, this idea appeared only in
footnote four to an otherwise obscure opinion written by Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone, United States v. Carolene Products." Yet the approach the
23. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. I have found no contemporaneous mention at all of the Carolene Products decision
in leading newspapers; there was hardly much more coverage of the Erie decision. See T.
FnRE, HARmoNY AND DISSONANCE: Tim Swift & Erie CASES IN AMiCAN FED RAILsM (1981).
25. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a useful discussion of the importance of this decision, and
its historic context, see T. FtEYER, supra, note 25.
26. In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, Justice Brandeis reformulated the relationship between
federal and state law and between federal and state courts. Suffice it to note that the
constitutional basis of Brandeis's decision on federalism is hard to locate, but that this decision
about diversity jurisdiction was the culmination of a campaign he and Holmes had. orchestrated
foi decades to try to halt freewheeling federal court intervention against the progressive
possibilities Brandeis and Holmes saw in social experimentation in the individual states. On
the other hand, Erie rejected the defense of the older diversity doctrine that proclaimed that
outsiders needed protection from the manipulation of state law by state courts in the interests
of local insiders. Erie, in this sense, refused to continue to view out-of-state legal claimants
as a group in need of special, federal court protection.
27. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Actually, only three Justices joined that part of Stone's opinion
which contained the famous footnote: Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Justice Louis D.
Brandeis and Justice Owen J. Roberts. Justice Hugo L. Black refused to agree to that part
of Stone's opinion, since Black wished to go further than Stone in proclaiming deference to
legislative judgments. Justice Pierce Butier concurred only in the result; Justice James C.
McReynolds dissented; and Justices Benjamin N. Cardozo and Stanley F. Reed did not take
part.
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footnote's three paragraphs suggested was to prove crucial in the treatment
of minorities in American law.28 A brief description of the footnote is
necessary to understand what the Court did and did not say about special
judicial scrutiny of government actions affecting certain groups. It will also
illuminate the pervasive retrenchment from the footnote four approach in
recent Supreme Court decisions.
C. Carolene Products
Actually, the Carolene Products holding was part of a trend toward a
new, limited role for federal courts. In contrast to the rash of decisions that
had invalidated important elements of the New Deal and triggered Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's court-packing scheme in 1937, the new judicial outlook
proclaimed extreme judicial deference to the social and economic policies of
the popularly-elected branches. Justice Stone's majority opinion sought to
consolidate developing restraints on judicial intervention in economic mat-
ters.29 The opinion suggested virtually an ironclad presumption in favor of
the constitutionality of all social and economic legislation, including Con-
gress' power to regulate the quality as well as the price of milk shipped in
interstate commerce.30 In footnote four, however, Stone went on to suggest
the categories of constitutional claims that might deprive government action
of the extreme deference it otherwise should enjoy.
The first paragraph, added at the urging of Chief Justice Hughes, has
been the least controversial. That paragraph suggested special judicial concern
when rights explicit in the text of the constitution are at issue. This individ-
ualistic, interpretivist position involved less of a judicial leap than the
possibility, mentioned in the rest of the footnote, of additional grounds for
judicial refusal to defer to judgments of other governmental branches.
28. Even former Justice Lewis H. Powell, who helped lead the recent retrenchment from
the footnote four approach, acknowledged that this footnote contained "perhaps the most
far-sighted dictum in our modem judicial heritage." Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82
CoLum. L. REv. 1087 (1982). Numerous other commentators, most notably John Hart Ely in
his influential book, DEmocpAcY AN DSrusT (1980), have celebrated and elaborated con-
stitutional norms as extrapolations from the famous footnote. For further discussion, see
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 CoLTJm. L. Rav. 1093 (1982).
29. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) symbolized the new trend. In
this decision upholding state minimum wage legislation, the Court reversed itself dramatically
and abandoned the individualistic, substantive due process approach generally connected to
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its progeny. This change, cleverly albeit
inaccurately dubbed the "switch in time that saved nine," often is invoked to describe a
constitutional revolution associated with President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. See generally
Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (identifying self-government
on a national level during three "constitutional moments").
30. Stone's opinion upheld a 1923 federal ban on the interstate shipment of filled milk.
The Court reversed a lower federal court and, indirectly, the Illinois Supreme Court. It held
that Congress had power to label as adulterated "Milnut," a form of skimmed milk in which
butterfat was replaced by cheaper, less wholesome coconut milk. This now seems unremarkable.
At the time, however, not only was the result in Carolene Products somewhat innovative, but
the theory of special judicial scrutiny in footnote four was new and even daring.
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:381
The footnote's second paragraph suggested special judicial skepticism in
challenges to any state action that might interfere with "those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unde-
sirable legislation." This paragraph seems premised on the assumption of a
regulated social life gradually purifying itself of undesirable legislation. To
illustrate the ways in which clogged political channels might be grounds for
unusually exacting judicial review, Stone cited earlier decisions invalidating
restrictions on the right to vote, the dissemination of information, freedom
of political association, and peaceable assembly."
The footnote's third and final paragraph is the most important for our
purposes. Government action directed at particular religious, national, or
racial minorities, Stone said, might merit special judicial scrutiny. He sum-
marized the problem as "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities."
Such prejudice, Stone asserted in language that was notably cautious and
abstract, if not obscure, "may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." 32
Judicial and scholarly disagreement has continued and intensified about
when and if any special, activist role is appropriate for judges confronting
claims by "discrete and insular" groups.33 It is useful to divide the main
arguments centering on footnote four into two questions: First, if we assume
that the category "discrete and insular minorities" includes African-Ameri-
cans, what, if any, other groups ought to be included? Second, does
31. All of the decisions Stone cited are at least partially First Amendment decisions,
with the exception of two "right to vote" cases: Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) and
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). These cases invalidated attempts to exclude blacks
entirely from voting in Democratic Party primaries in Texas. Ironically, Herndon was written
by Justice Holmes, who found it "hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement
of the Fourteenth Amendment," though his vilification of equality claims in Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927), came less than two months later. See supra note 12 (discussing Buck v. Bell).
32. For this crucial proposition, Stone cited two commerce clause decisions, as well as
First Amendment decisions that invalidated laws held to be discriminatory based on religion
and national origin and the racial discrimination in voting cases he also cited in the previous
paragraph.
33. The Court neither immediately nor fully adopted the activist, strict scrutiny approach
suggested by footnote four. This was underscored quickly in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (December 12, 1938), the Court's first great step toward Brown v. Board of
Education. In holding that the exclusion of a black man from the University of Missouri Law
School was unconstitutional, the Court made no mention of footnote four nor did the decision
reflect the footnote's proposed approach. Chief Justice Hughes's majority opinion stressed
only that separate had to be equal. Therefore, Missouri's offer to pay tuition for Gaines to
attend an integrated law school in a neighboring state did not satisfy his personal right. "It
was as an individual that he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws," Hughes stated,
and Missouri was bound to afford him substantially equal legal education, "whether or not
other negroes sought the same opportunity." 305 U.S. at 351. By 1954, however, such insistent
individualism seemed to disappear as the Court proclaimed that an entire class of black
students, with hearts and minds ineluctably assaulted by official segregation, could not be
equal so long as the law kept them separate.
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paragraph three of the footnote essentially overlap with the footnote's other
paragraphs or does it supplement them by suggesting additional judicial
solicitude for certain groups?34
"Discrete and insular minorities" seemed to designate longstanding
outgroups, groups in which membership itself often became a cause for
mistrust, hostility, or worse. These unmeltable groups experienced "special
vulnerability to predictable perversions by the majoritarian process. '35 In
other words, these minorities repeatedly have been made scapegoats. Major-
itarian politics obviously long has been-and still is-manipulated through
explicit or encoded racism. African-Americans seemed the paradigmatic
"footnote four" minority. Past discrimination and present membership yield
current injury. Moreover, this is a special injury, to which attention must
be paid. The injury is uniquely prone to be exacerbated, either by invidious
legislation or by the absence of legislation. This renders judicial neutrality
not neutrality, but rather complicity in perpetuating past wrongs.
Footnote four appeared the month after Hitler took over Austria, as
Stalin's show trials disposed of the last of the old Bolsheviks, and as Italian
and German aid decisively turned the tide to Franco in the Spanish Civil
War.36 Even within the largely isolationist United States, labor battles and
34. Notoriously, during World War 11 the Court for the first time stated explicitly that
racial discrimination should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, but did so as a majority of the
Justices failed to discern racial discrimination in a series of cases arising out of the internment
of the Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast. The Court in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), found a compelling government interest sufficient to override the claims
of the interned Japanese-Americans. For a lucid historical treatment of the wartime litigation,
see P. IRONS, JusnicE AT WAR (1983), which includes discussion of the movement for reparations
for historic wrongs and the launching of successful coram nobis cases brought, decades later,
to vacate the sentences of Japanese-Americans convicted for curfew and internment order
violations.
After the war, however, the Court refused to allow California to deny commercial fishing
licenses to Japanese aliens. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948)
(even if legitimate state objectives were assumed, California statute that barred persons
"ineligible for citizenship"-e.g., Japanese-from commercial fishing licenses held to violate
federal statutory and constitutional guarantees that "protect 'all persons' against state legislation
bearing unequally upon them either because of race or color"). Justice Black wrote for the
majority; Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, concurred separately, emphasizing the
extent to which the 1943 California statute was a direct outgrowth of anti-Japanese antagonism;
and Justice Reed dissented. Ironically, the precedent most directly relied on by both Black
and Reed was Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), discussed supra, note 19. See also Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (invalidating escheat to California of land held by
interned Japanese alien as guardian for son because "only the most exceptional circumstances
can excuse [racial] discrimination").
35. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1292 n.14 (1982).
36. D. THOmSON, EUROPE SiNcE NAPOLEON 711-30 (rev. ed. 1966). For a succinct
description of the unexaggeratable horror of the Anschluss, which brought forms of anti-
semitism more virulent than anything yet practiced in Germany, see P. GAY, FREOM: A Lim'
FOR OUR TmE 622-28 (pap. ed. 1989) (including direct impact on aged Sigmund Freud and
his family, despite personal efforts by Roosevelt and others on their behalf). N.Y. Times,
Apr. 4, 1938, at 1, cols. 1, 2, 3.
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ethnic and racial tension added to what seemed a particularly explosive
Spring.17 As Robert Cover put it, "IMlinorities ... in the sense we use the
term today-religious, ethnic, national, and racial minorities-became a
special object of judicial protection only with footnote four, which was
written at almost the exact moment when majoritarianism became the
dominant constitutional perspective." 3 The paragraph suggested the need
for judicial limits on permissible democratic action, and even certain inaction,
that perpetuated the burdens of past victimization of special groups.
As new groups, such as mentally retarded, physically handicapped, and
homosexual citizens, began to allege discriminatory treatment, the meaning
of "discrete and insular minorities" began to seem increasingly problematic. 39
Moreover, determining what groups are "similarly situated"-the grundnorm
for assuring them legal equality-depends on where you are when you happen
to look. The Court vividly illustrated this when it rejected an equal protection
challenge to the denial of state disability benefits to pregnant women on the
grounds that the distinction drawn by California was between "pregnant
women and non-pregnant persons," rather than between women and men.40
Despite a flood of equal protection decisions, the legal argument still focuses
on whether it is appropriate to relegate those who claim discrimination at
the hands of the majority to the economic or political marketplace.
A majority of the Justices today seem to share a pervasive national
nostalgia for a simpler, freer, and happier time-that-never-was. Only a
smoking gun-i.e., incontrovertible proof of a specific discriminatory motive
that an individual plaintiff can tie directly to his or her own plight-will
move the Court to acknowledge that discrimination, even against African-
Americans, may still be legally relevant . 4  Judges thus simplify their work
37. In hindsight, the explosive sit-in strikes in 1937 and the labor violence that followed
suggested that "the American labor movement has been the most violent nonrevolutionary
movement in the world; but the middle-class character of labor's goals could have been doubted
then." J.W. HowARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY 157 (1968). As economic recession worsened in
early 1938, the CIO formally broke away from the AFL and Congress, worried about internal
threats, created the forerunner of the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by
Representative Martin Dies. The deteriorating economic situation; vigorous, even violent,
domestic conflict triggered by events in Europe, such as violence surrounding meetings of the
German-American Bund in New York City; and obvious, massive cracks in the reigning
Democratic Party coalition made it seem in the Spring of 1938 that the New Deal, and perhaps
the nation, might be in danger of collapse.
38. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1294 (1982). Cover made it clear that he referred only to American law and assigned
pride of place to international law for recognizing and attempting to do something to protect
minorities in the wake of World War I. Id. at 1297.
39. Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv.
L. Rnv. 10 (1987), provides a summary of recent cases and a provocative discussion of the
"difference dilemma."
40. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). Although the issue of gender
difference is beyond the scope of this essay, issues of sameness and difference are crucial to
much contemporary feminist discourse.
41. There has been considerable discussion of this trend. For criticism of its beginnings,
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by deferring to whatever results emerge from a Hobbesian social struggle.
Even better, each citizen has only himself to blame if he loses in life's great
struggle. The sobering history of different groups has been called off. The
dream of equality for all individuals has been achieved. It is everyone for
his or her future self.
III. THE FIFY YA GAP: FREEDOM FROM ASSOCIATION wrm GUiLT
A. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union I: "External Criteria"
To love history probably is to love coincidefice. Fifty years to the day
after Carolene Products, the United States Supreme Court announced, by a
5-4 vote, that a case involving alleged racial harassment, Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union,42 would be set down for reargument. The Court asked the'
lawyers to address a question not-previously raised. The justices took the
initiative to ask: Should the Court overrule a 1976 decision, Runyon v.
McCrary, that held that the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibited private schools
from excluding qualified children solely because of their race?43 This question
touched off a passionate public debate unusual even in a nation obsessed
with what the Supreme Court seems to be doing. At the moment, however,
the language used by the five justices who voted to pose that question for
reargument merits close attention. The brief per curiam opinion captures the
recrudescence of an extreme, abstract individualistic ethos in American courts
today.
To begin at the conclusion: the per curiam opinion ended by responding
to an argument, made in both dissenting opinions, 44 that the Court should
see, e.g., Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 Onio ST. L.J. 383 (1981); a careful
dissection of the crucial middle stage is available in Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HLv. L. REv. 78 (1986); the most recent aspects were
unpacked skillfully in Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 Msc.m L. REv. 1729 (1989).
42. 485 U.S. 617 (April 25, 1988). The lower court had decided that the 1866 Civil
Rights Act did not protect a black plaintiff from racial harassment in the workplace. The
Court's April 25th order introduced the question: "Whether or not the interpretation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be
reconsidered?"
43. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), determined by a 7-2 vote that the 1866
Civil Rights Act could reach private acts of racial discrimination. Justice Stewart's majority
opinion held that a private school that advertised widely and otherwise comported itself as a
business could be held liable under the statute for overt racial discrimination. In an important
concurring opinion, however, Justice Powell emphasized the particular commercial aspects of
the school at issue, and argued that the result might well be different in the case, for example,
of a private tutor. Justice White, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that §
1981 dealing with contracts ought not to be read as broadly as § 1982 dealing with property
rights. Justices Stevens and Powell concurred separately. Both argued that they would decide
otherwise if the case posed a new question, but that stare decisis required them to agree with
the majority, though they cautioned against a broad reading of its holding.
44. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, objected to
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be particularly loath to upset an important statutory precedent that favors
civil rights plaintiffs. The majority answered:
We do not believe that the Court may recognize any such exception
to the abiding rule that it treat all litigants equally: that is, that the
claim of any litigant for the application of a rule to its case should
not be influenced by the Court's view of the worthiness of the
litigant in terms of extralegal criteria. We think this is what Congress
meant when it required each Justice or judge of the United States
to swear to 'administer justice without respect to persons, and do
equal right to the poor and to the rich...,45
We should attend to three distinct, although interrelated, reasons that make
the majority's rhetoric in Patterson both illuminating and troubling: First,
the per curiam opinion expressed the notion that race-the very criterion
which constitutes the basis for civil rights claims-is fungible with other
"external criteria." A higher judicial duty requires judges to treat all litigants
abstractly and, thereby, to treat them formally as equal.
Second, the majority apparently believed the specific judicial obligation
to do "equal right to the poor and to the rich" to be synonymous with the
idea that all litigants should be treated as if they are exactly the same. The
majority Justices insisted that the judicial obligation to do "equal right"
requires judges to be blind to what they know as women and men. This
obligation would require judges to ignore different starting places, significant
encumbrances, and the weight of the past. It rejects a basic point made by
John Winthrop, Ronald Reagan's favorite Puritan, in the early days of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony: "If the same penalty hits a rich man, it pains
him not, it is not affliction to him, but if it lights upon a poor man, it
breaks his back."' ' Yet litigants are not interchangeable ciphers. They are
defined by their histories and their group associations. Thus the Court noted,
as it struck down state court enforcement of restrictive covenants in 1948,
"Equal protection of the laws is not achieved by indiscriminate imposition
of inequalities." 47
the majority's decision to reach out "to reconsider an interpretation of a civil rights statute
that so clearly reflects our society's earnest commitment to ending racial discrimination ......
485 U.S. at 621. Justice Stevens, joined by the three other dissenters, wrote a separate dissent
in which he decried the majority's decision because it "replace[s] what is ideally a sense of
guaranteed right with the uneasiness of unsecured privilege." Id. at 622. Stevens also noted
the deleterious impact of the decision not only on faith in law maintained by victims of
discrimination, but also on public perceptions of the Court as impartial and restrained.
45. Id. at 619 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 453).
46. 4 WINTHROP PAPERS 349, 351-52 (Mass. Hist. Soc. 1929-47), anticipating William
Blake in "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," stating that "One Law for the Lion & Ox is
Oppression." POETRY AND PROSE OF WIIAM BLAKE 191 (G. Keynes ed. 1961). Cf. PLATO, 2
Tm REPUBLIC VIII, § 558 at 291 (P. Shorey trans. 1956 ed.) (describing democracy as
"anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals
alike").
47. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). Philip Kurland aptly termed Chief Justice
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Finally, the per curiam opinion went further than allowing the "indis-
criminate imposition of inequalities." It suggested that indiscriminate treat-
ment is obligatory. Upon close reading, however, the ironclad judicial oath
the majority invoked hardly draws such individual/group and legal/extralegal
distinctions. The oath does not define "equal right" as lack of awareness
of group differences. Nor does it hint of distinguishing intrinsic from extrinsic
characteristics. Finally, the meaning of "respect to persons" is considerably
more complex in terms of both etymology and history than the per curiam
opinion suggested.41 The Court aggressively presumed, however, that no
approach to justice would allow judges to protect the downtrodden. This
willed obliviousness towards history co-exists awkwardly with recent judicial
activism in constructing the very categories the judges elsewhere consider
immutable, natural groupings, i.e., race, tribes, and families.
B. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union II: The Result
In Patterson II, the Court unanimously agreed not to overrule Runyon
v. McCrary.49 The Justices reaffirmed that section 1981 prohibits racial
Vinson's Shelley opinion "the Finnegan's Wake of constitutional law," Kurland, 1963 Term-
Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of
the Government", 78 HtAv. L. R-v. 143, 148 (1964). Still, some structure emerges. Vinson
emphasized that "equality in the enjoyment of property rights" was "an essential pre-
condition" of other basic civil rights and civil liberties "guaranteed to the individual" by the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 10, 22. He made this argument to counteract a defense of the
restrictive covenants that claimed that because the restrictions affected white as well as black
citizens, they did not deny equal protection. Shelley's emphasis on positive as well as negative
aspects of equal protection may be read as a direct repudiation of the formal equality approach
of Truax v. Corrigan, discussed supra, at note 17. In Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948),
the companion case that extended Shelley to federal as well as state law, it is ironic that the
trial court found the petitioner to be a Negro, though "James M. Hurd maintained that he
is not a Negro but a Mohawk Indian." Id. at 27 n.2.
By the time of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, Shelley's insistent individualism
seemed to disappear. See supra note 36. Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952)
(upholding Illinois' group libel statute punishing expression "directed at groups with whose
position and esteem in society the affiliated individual may be inextricably involved").
48. For a cogent explanation of the origins of the oath, and a discussion of how "the
exact contours of impartiality vary with custom, law, and experience," see Noonan, Judicial
Impartiality and The Judiciary Act of 1789, 14 NovA L. Rav. 123 (1989). The oath was a
shortened version of the oath taken by judges of the British crown, but it incorporated an
addition made in Virginia by Chancellor George Wythe. Wythe derived his addition-swearing
to administer justice "without respect to persons"-from translations of Old and New
Testament sources that forbade a judge to become a surety, to "lift up the face" of one being
judged. "[T]hat is," as Judge Noonan put it, "not to treat the rich better than the poor."
Id. at 125. See also J. NOONAN, B~aR.s 16, 69, 428 (1984).
Perhaps the most outspoken proponent of a contrary view of judicial oaths was Lysander
Spooner, an anarchist and antislavery activist. Spooner explained, "Judges and other public
officers habitually appeal to the pretended obligation of their oaths, when about to perform
some act of iniquity, for which they can find no other apology, and for which they feel
obliged to offer some apology." L. SPOONER, TBE UNCONSTrioNA Y OF SLAvERY 152
(1860).
49. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The Justices unanimously
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discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts. But the
Justices disagreed vehemently about the extent of that prohibition. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion held that "the right to make contracts does not
extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer
after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms
of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions."50 On
this formalistic view of contract law, the Court ignored both the substance
and the historical context of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, passed primarily to
protect newly-freed slaves. It is bizarre against the historic backdrop. Con-
gress premised the 1866 Civil Rights Act on its new power under the
Thirteenth Amendment, declared to be ratified only the previous December. 5'
The newly-freed slaves hardly came to their initial opportunities to make
and enforce contracts with equal bargaining power. Lengthy congressional
hearings and debates articulated concern to guarantee equality, particularly
because of extensive evidence of virulent, racially-based harassments of free
contractual relationships in the South.
Justice Kennedy not only failed to heed this historic context, he belittled
it. Kennedy protested too much when he proclaimed, at the conclusion of
his majority opinion, that the Court was not "signaling one inch of retreat
from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in the private, as well as the
joined Justice Kennedy's opinion on the stare decisis point, but Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and, in part, Justice Stevens, dissented from the racial harassment
aspect of the majority's opinion. Stevens also wrote separately in dissent.
50. Id. at 177. The majority's remarkably pinched lexicographic approach was evident
from the start of its discussion of the statute at issue. Justice Kennedy began by quoting
Section 1981, the relevant remnant of the 1866 Civil Rights Act: "All-persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and territory to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions
of every kind, and to no other." Id. (emphasis added). Remarkably, however, he then asserted,
"The most obvious feature of the provision is the restriction of its scope to forbidding
discrimination in the 'mak[ing] and enforce[ment]' of contracts alone." Id. at 176. This is
"the most obvious feature" only if one stops reading at the word "contract." To read the
final part of the section, italicized above, is to be forced at least to wonder at the meaning
of the clear textual effort to guarantee "full" as well as "equal" benefit of "all laws and
proceedings" to "all persons." Equally noteworthy is Congress' attempt to assure that no
person in the nation would suffer different pain, penalty, exaction, etc., than all other fully
protected citizens might suffer.
51. The majority seemed certain of the "plain and common sense meaning" of the
statutory terms "make" and "enforce" and therefore did not deign to consider the debates
or political context surrounding passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Yet even a most
conservative contemporaneous reading of the Civil War Amendments believed it obvious that
their primary purpose was to afford federal protection from "discrimination against the negroes
as a class." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). Moreover, close attention
to the congressional debates, President Johnson's blundering, and the highly-publicized harsh-
ness of the end of slavery suggests that racial harassment was a serious problem, clearly
targeted by Congress in 1866. See generally L. LrSWACK, BEEN nm TH SToim So LONG (1979);
E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION-AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988); Soifer,
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979).
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public, sphere." "Nevertheless," he added, "in the areas of private discrim-
ination, to which the ordinance of the Constitution does not directly extend,"
the Court must play a role "limited to interpreting what Congress may do
and has done."5 2 By diminishing the amendment that abolished private
slavery and involuntary servitude throughout the nation, and by somehow
rendering that amendment not a direct part of the Constitution's "ordinance"
(whatever that means), the majority proclaimed not a retreat but a rout.
C. The Inversion of Footnote Four
This bleak view of the result in Patterson is underscored by several other
civil rights decisions by the Supreme Court last Term. City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.5 is most revealing. In invalidating a minority set-aside
provision in the city of Richmond, Virginia, the majority noted: "The dream
of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal
opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences
based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."5' 4 To avoid mosaic
law, therefore, the majority found it necessary to restrict remedial efforts
by state and local entities to situations in which the effects of identified
discrimination within the relevant jurisdiction can be specifically demon-
strated. Otherwise, "racial politics" would now prevail. 5 Thus, the history
of Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy and a leading site in resistance
to school integration, was quarantined, then ignored.
As Justice Marshall pointed out in passionate dissent, the majority, by
adopting strict scrutiny for the first time in the context of an equal protection
challenge to race-conscious remedial measures, ignored the profound differ-
ence between "governmental actions that themselves are racist, and govern-
mental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to prevent
52. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 188.
53. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The Justices in the majority actually were sharply splintered,
but a majority endorsed Section III-B of Justice O'Connor's lead opinion, the section I will
discuss briefly. Justices Marshall and Blackmun wrote searing dissents, which Justice Brennan
joined. The two other most notable decisions sharply restricting civil rights claims last Term
were: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (civil rights plaintiff has
burden of proving employer has no business reason for practice even if it has dramatic
discriminatory effects) and Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (new group of white
firefighters allowed to intervene to challenge 1981 Birmingham, Alabama consent decree alleged
to be reverse discrimination). Such decisions led Justice Marshall to suggest "a deliberate
retrenchment of the civil rights agenda" by the Court which put the nation "back where we
started" at the time of Brown v. Board of Education. Greenhouse, Marshall Says Court's
Rulings Imperil Rights, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
54. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989).
55. Id. at 510. O'Connor's fear was not accurate in terms of the actual political situation
that led to Richmond's affirmative action program; it also simply ignored Richmond's blatantly
racial political history. Moreover, she stated her discovery of racial politics at the state and
local level in a manner insulting to black officeholders, as Marshall forcefully pointed out.
For excellent, detailed discussion of Croson and its rhetoric, see Ross, The Richmond
Narratives, 68 TEXAs L. REv. 381 (1989); M. RosENFELD, supra note 41.
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neutral governmental activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism." ' 6
Moreover, the battle against racism has hardly been won, Marshall argued,
and race remains constitutionally germane "precisely because race remains
dismayingly relevant in American life. '" 57
The central failure of the majority opinion occurred not because issues
of affirmative action are easy-they are gut-wrenchingly difficult. Nor was
it only that the economic interest of a white-owned contractor, curiously the
only bidder for the relevant city contract, seemed a bizarre setting for
aggressive protection of the equal dignity and respect of the individual
plaintiff. Rather, it was the Court's willingness to operate in a vacuum, to
wrench Richmond and its attempt to remedy past wrongs entirely out of the
specific historical setting of those wrongs. To Justice Scalia, who concurred
in the judgment, "[t]he relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or
Jews, or Irish who were discriminated against, but that it was individual
men and women, 'created equal,' who were discriminated against."5 8
In emphasizing the need for specific proof and individualism, in deni-
grating group identity as a relevant factor, and rushing to jettison racial
history as relevant to current reality, Patterson and Croson illustrate the
complete rejection of the footnote four approach. Indeed, Croson comes
perilously close to resuscitating Truax v. Corrigan. The majority aggressively
employed what it claimed were neutral equal protection principles to inval-
idate reform measures not to the liking of a particular majority of the
Justices. All concern for "discrete and insular minorities" is gone. In its
place, a white-owned business now may trigger strict judicial scrutiny of a
remedial government contracting scheme.
IV. INVOLUNTARY GROUPS AS JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTS
A. Tales of Origins: Families and Tribes
Much Anglo-American law is devoted to macadamizing and pulverizing. 9
Our essential perception involves individuals on one side of the scales of
56. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is not entirely clear what
test the majority agreed to apply in applying "strict scrutiny" to a claim of discrimination by
a white contractor. Scalia expressed an even narrower idea of what might satisfy the test than
the four justices who joined in this section of O'Connor's plurality opinion. Stevens voted
with them, but did not accept the "strict scrutiny" test.
57. Id. at 558.
58. Id. at 527. Scalia conceded that "It is plainly true that in our society blacks have
suffered discrimination immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups," id.,
but he considered this group fact constitutionally irrelevant. It is particularly ironic, in light
of the judicial approach in Croson, that Justice Stevens, who concurred in part and concurred
in the judgment, argued that while race is not always irrelevant, "It is the judicial system,
rather than the legislative process, that is best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to
fashion remedies that will create the conditions that presumably would have existed had no
wrong been committed." Id. at 513-14.
59. See Introduction, 0. GmascE, POLrrIcAl. THnomEs oF THE MmDa AoES i-xiv (F.W.
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justice and agencies of the state on the other. The role of courts is to balance
between the two. To introduce even a third component seems unacceptable:
it cannot be handled neatly in the either/or world of legal winners and
losers. We picture Justice blindfolded. 6° If she could see, she would require
powerful bifocals.
The current United States Supreme Court, in decisions ranging from
who may enter court to who leaves it with a death sentence, repeatedly has
emphasized the need to demonstrate particularized individual harm even to
initiate any civil rights claim. 6' Yet, almost despite itself, the Court frequently
must deal with exactly those groups that provide identities to individuals.
For example, in several decisions in the 1988 Term, the Justices wrestled
with the active role of law in the construction of family units. The Court
also confronted several cases involving Native American tribes, social group-
ings so anomalous that their stories generally are omitted from American
constitutional law accounts. 62 Attention to the deeply paradoxical approaches
the Court took in decisions about families and tribes last Term illustrates
the importance of thinking more clearly about involuntary groups. Conser-
vative judges do not simply endorse even what they believe naturally exists.
Moreover, categories such as birth, genetics, and ethnicity turn out to be
decidedly problematic in themselves. They are now virtually wild cards in
the hands of judges.
B. Legal Construction of the Family
In a decision handed down the same day as Patterson II, Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion celebrated "the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not
be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop
Maitland trans. 1900). See generally M. Mirow, MAxING ALL TH DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
ExcLusIoN, AND AmERICAN LAw (1990). Cf. To a Steam Roller, in M. Moore, COLLECTED
PoEms 90 (1961) ("You crush all particles down/ into close conformity, and then walk back
and forth/ on them").
60. Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987).
61. To have standing, for example, "at an irreducible minimum, Art. III [of the United
States Constitution] requires the party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury.... .' Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)
(citations omitted); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-56 (1984). And to make out
an equal protection claim of discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty, statistics
will not suffice, since the condemned person "must prove that the decisionmakers in his case
acted with discriminatory purpose." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (emphasis
in original). But cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-8 (1989) ("probabilistic" factors
have probative value and together amount to reasonable suspicion sufficient to support Drug
Enforcement Agency airport stop of suspected drug smuggler).
62. Milner Ball and Robert Williams provide powerful elaborations of the impact of the
multitude of ways in which "[t]he American story of origins fundamentally excludes tribes
and denies them voice." Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICe. L.
REv. 2280, 2300 (1989); R. Wn.tIwIs, JR., Tan AmERICAN INDIAN IN WEsTEmR LEoAL Touoairr:
Tan DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
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within the unitary family." 63 But the Court's proclaimed attention to "historic
respect" turned out not to respect history and only to honor abstract legal
categories. In Michael H. v Gerald D., the Court upheld California's
conclusive presumption that precluded a biological father from introducing
in court blood tests that provided clear evidence of his paternity, paternity
which he and the mother acknowledged, and which he now wished to
establish legally. California's legislative presumption, grounded in the com-
mon law, was that in a marital relationship the husband must be presumed
the father of any child born to the mother during the marriage., This leg@l
construct should prevail over undisputed contrary facts, the Court held. It
did not matter that the child in question, aged eight at the time of the
decision, joined her biological father in his constitutional challenge to Cali-
fornia's irrebuttable presumption that precluded the "real" father and daugh-
ter from continuing their relationship.
Scalia may have been unnecessarily snide when he said, "The facts of
the case are, we must hope, extraordinary."6  But his sneering turned out
to be essential to the plurality's approach. "California law, like nature itself,
makes no provisions for dual fatherhood," Scalia added. 6 Once he could
presume this dichotomy, Scalia chose law over nature without further ado. 67
The Due Process claim by the natural father and his daughter could not
be upheld, Scalia claimed, because the liberty they invoked lacked roots "in
history and tradition."6s Indeed, to avoid the breakdown of the rule of law
63. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). The Justices were sharply divided
and unusually vitriolic, even judged by the quite embittered standards of the current Court.
Justice Scalia wrote for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist. They were joined in all but
footnote 6 by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgment;
he disagreed with Scalia's position, which Stevens took to reject the possibility that a natural
father could ever have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child
whose mother was married and cohabiting with another man at the time of the child's
conception and birth. Stevens cast his decisive vote with Scalia, however, because Stevens read
California law to afford the natural father an opportunity to be heard. Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented from what he saw as the "make-believe"
atmosphere of the plurality opinion. Id. at 156. Justice White, joined by Brennan, also wrote
a dissent.
64. The common law presumption could be rebutted only by proof that the husband
was incapable of procreation or by his total lack of access to the wife, and the grounds for
rebuttal of the presumption were strictly construed., Id. at 124.
65. Id. at 113.
66. Id. at 118.
67. Curiously, in dismissing an unusual equal protection claim raised on behalf of the
daughter, Scalia explicitly hid behind a legal fiction. Victoria D.'s lawyer argued that equal
protection required that Victoria ought to have an opportunity to rebut her presumed legitimacy
because California law provided an exception that allowed her mother, and perhaps also the
presumed father, to rebut the conclusive presumption of legitimacy. But, Scalia argued,
"Illegitimacy is a legal construct, not a natural trait." Id. at 131. Enthusiastic deference to a
"legal construct" then led Scalia to the extremely deferential "rational relationship" equal
protection test and thereby to the rejection of Victoria's claim.
68. Id. at 123. Scalia said,"The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society,
which we have referred to as the 'unitary family,' is typified, of course, by the marital family,
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threatened by the dissenters' pluralistic approach, Scalia asserted, there must
be a rule to determine the appropriate level of historical generality to use in
identifying constitutional tradition. 9 The tradition behind the conclusive
presumption was fundamental, Scalia argued, because he could trace its
ancient common law roots. By contrast, the claimed biological parent-child
relationship lacked such a tradition.
However, even if one were to accept Scalia's notion of history as
determinative, his pinched perspective on what counts as history is inade-
quate. Minority groups are simply left out. Yet to look almost anywhere in
the nation is to see the continuing effects of racial and ethnic mixtures,
combinations, and recombinations of white masters and black slaves, for
example, or the diverse family structures of Native Americans, Hawaiians,
and Spanish-speaking peoples. But attention to the family histories of such
subgroups would demolish Scalia's happy homogenization of family tradition.
Perhaps because history of families in the United States overflows with
jagged edges and recalcitrant chunks, Scalia replaced the complex conglom-
eration of the past with a dream, a recipe that could yield a frothy, entirely
nondescript concoction once all ingredients were folded smoothly into an
imaginary master blender.7 0
In sharp contrast, Brennan's vehement dissent argued for an ongoing,
open-ended assessment of fundamental values. Rather than view the Consti-
tution as "a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices
and superstitions of a time long past," Brennan asserted, the Court should
recognize that "[w]e are not an assimilative, homogenous society, but a
facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone
else's unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the same tolerant impulse
protects our idiosyncracies."' Yet Brennan too readily conceded the relevant
history to Scalia. Brennan condemned Scalia for "exclusively historical
analysis" and for seeking the "tradition" Scalia considered determinative by
but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children." Id. at 123 n.3. He
did not explain why this was his family limit, though in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (plurality opinion), Justice Powell said the "tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household" had "roots equally venerable
and equally deserving of constitutional recognition" as the traditions protecting the nuclear
family. Instead Scalia resorted to the 'slippery slope argument' and claimed that the logic of
Brennan's dissenting position would lead to the conclusion that if Michael had begotten
Victoria by rape, he might assert the same liberty interest in his relationship with her that he
did here. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 n.4.
69. Scalia claimed that judges should discover "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." Id. at 127
n.6. It is noteworthy that only Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed to accompany Scalia in this
excursion seeking a rule as to the appropriate level of historical abstraction.
70. It was thus unnecessary to consider more complex, nuanced family narratives. For
good introductions to the relevant historical work, see, e.g., H. GurmA, Tan BLACK FAmeLY
n SLAvERY AN FREEDOM, 1750-1925 (1976); G. NASH, RED, WHrrE, AND BLACK: THE PEOPLEs
OF EARLY AmERIcA (1974); M. SAHuNS, IsLANDS OF HISTORY (1985).
71. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141.
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"poring through dusty volumes of American history. ' '7 But the dissenters
failed to make any affirmative alternative historical case. They attacked
Scalia's reliance on mandarin texts, but they did not suggest that the past,
viewed from the bottom up and not exclusively from the formal vantage
point of law books and treatises, would tell a very different historical story
about families. Actually, such history complements the arguments the dis-
senters made about the advent of relfable blood tests, and changes in societal
values, and explodes Scalia's parochial definition of tradition.
Ironically, Brennan and Scalia were on the same side in Mississippi Band
of Choctaw v. Holyfeld,3 in which the Court also rejected the claims of
natural parents. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in this case had to stretch
considerably to give exclusive jurisdiction to the Choctaw tribal court. Twin
babies, whose formal state court adoption was challenged by the tribe, had
been adopted more than three years earlier by non-tribal parents through
regular court procedures. The children were born 200 miles away and had
never lived on, nor even visited, the Choctaw reservation. Their biological
parents, both members of the tribe, voluntarily surrendered the twins for
adoption a few weeks after the twins' birth. The biological parents continued
to appear in court alongside the adoptive parents to urge that the initial
state court adoption not be upset. Nevertheless, Brennan's latitudinarian
statutory interpretation held that the twins' domicile remained on the res-
ervation with which they never had contact, despite their biological parents'
consistent efforts to avoid such a connection. The Court found also that
Congress had intended the tribal court to have exclusive jurisdiction, even
if this meant reopening an adoption that had endured without problems for
over three years. 74
Viewed together as double defeats for biological parents these two
decisions are somewhat surprising in themselves. Upon closer examination,
however, they become difficult to reconcile with one another and impossible
to reconcile with the Court's approach in other recent decisions to overlapping
realities of family, tribe, and racial groupings. At first glance, the Court in
both Michael H. and Mississippi Choctaw simply decided to defer to the
legislative judgments of California and Congress respectively. Closer attention
72. Id. at 137.
73. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, which turned on
the technical question of the meaning of 'domicile' for jurisdictional purposes within the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988); Justice Stevens, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, dissented. The Court did not consider any
constitutional issues.
74. Brennan acknowledged that this result might undermine the important relationships
already formed by the twins with their adoptive parents, but asserted that the tribal court was
simply being given jurisdiction, and that it might take such factors into account in making its
ultimate decision about where the twins should wind up. Edwin R. Smith, the lawyer for the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw reported in phone conversations in April and June, 1991 that
the tribal court decided finally that it was in the best interests of the children to leave them
with their adoptive, non-Indian mother, and that relations are now amicable between the
adoptive mother and the tribe. (The adoptive father died in the course of the litigation.)
INVOLUNTARY GROUPS
to what the Court said as well as to what it did suggests more significance
in both decisions. We find a majority of the justices seeking to advance
particular legal constructs of the family, even if this means ignoring biological
reality and the undisputed wishes of biological parents.7 5 Yet elsewhere
biology and the wishes of biological parents loom large in Supreme Court
decisions that deal with family and tribal units.76
Less than two months before Mississippi Choctaw, for example, the
Court held that Joshua DeShaney had no constitutional basis upon which
to claim protection from the state. Joshua was four when his father's beatings
culminated in such severe head injuries that Joshua will almost surely spend
the rest of his life in an institution for the profoundly retarded. The Court
conceded that the record showed that state authorities knew of Joshua's
plight. But Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held, "While the
State may have been aware of the dangers Joshua faced in the free world,
it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any
more vulnerable to them."' '
Rehnqulst divided children neatly into only two worlds. Some children
are in state custody; all others must rely on their own family nexus and
state law, or perhaps the kindness of strangers, in "the free world." Because
Joshua DeShaney was not actually in state custody, Wisconsin had no
constitutional duty to protect him. As he sustained beating after beating
from the time he was two years old, Joshua could rely only on the father
who beat him, to whom a state court had given custody of Joshua after his
parents' divorce.78 Though the record disclosed numerous contacts between
75. This has been true for a long time, of course, as the Mormon polygamy decisions
in the nineteenth century make clear, culminating in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (upholding federal law making bigamy a crime against freedom of religion claim). What
is remarkable, however, is that with the notable exception of the Mormons, other groups with
unusual family practices were treated with considerably more sympathy than the current
Supreme Court's approach suggests. See C. WEISBROD, THE BotuNDARms OF UTOPIA (1980).
Another way in which government traditionally and directly affected how American families
were constituted was through laws forbidding miscegenation. These laws finally were invalidated
on individual liberty and group equal protection grounds in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), but it is hard to see how a majority of the current Court could reach that result today,
given its willingness to defer to states in Michael H. and its requirement of specific discrimi-
natory intent in Croson and similar decisions. Laws against miscegenation, after all, treat
different races with formal equality.
76. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (functional definition of paternity
from context of father's acts); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right of Amish
parents not to send children to school after eighth grade); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (natural father's right to raise illegitimate children). But see Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 589 (1987) (Congress could require family receiving Aid to Families with Dependent
Children to include payments from noncustodial parents earmarked for individual children in
calculating family income). Other courts, of course, have begun to wrestle with the breakdown
of definitions of "natural" families in cases involving surrogate mothers and biogenetics more
generally.
77. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989)
(emphasis added).
78. For a description of the background, and a critique of the majority opinion, see
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:381
Joshua and government doctors, social workers, and police, Rehnquist
reasoned that to hold that the multitude of interventions by government
officials obliged Wisconsin to protect Joshua would give insufficient attention
to the rights of families and would unfairly transform the state into "the
permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having once offered him
shelter." 7 9 According to the DeShaney decision, a family with custody of a
child is the only source of protection for that child as a matter of consti-
tutional law, unless and until the state formally takes or reassigns custody.
C. Destruction of the Tribe
It should be obvious that the tribal jurisdiction extended in Mississippi
Choctaw functions in a universe less susceptible to binary choices than the
free world/custody dichotomy crucial to the Court's reasoning in DeShaney.
However, lest anyone think that the Court suddenly grows soft when a case
involves Native American tribal rights, we should first consider a few
contrasting decisions. Hodel v. Irving,1" for example, is far more typical of
the Court's current approach to tribal claims. In fact, Hodel v. Irving can
hardly be distinguished from Mississippi Choctaw. Both cases involved recent
congressional legislation passed to protect Indian tribes and to aid individuals
by emphasizing benefits Native Americans derive from their tribal contexts.
The dramatically conflicting results in the two cases suggest an unpleasant
truth about the relative priority of property and children in the Court's
view.
The Hodel Court unanimously conceded that Congress had made a good
faith effort to respond to a serious, intractable problem: the "extreme
fractionation of Indian lands.' '8 The statute provided that fractionated land
holdings not devised during the lifetime of their owners would escheat to
the tribe. Moreover, the Court conceded that "[c]onsolidation of Indian
Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the 'Free World' of DeShaney, 57 GEo. WASH. L.
Rnv. 1513 (1989).
79. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. Here, Rehnquist responded specifically to the fact that
Wisconsin's Child Protection Team that was regularly involved with Joshua actually once had
taken temporary legal custody of him. Compare Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984),
in which then-Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that children are "always in some form
of custody" so that "if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae."
80. 481 U.S. 704 (1987). Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's lead opinion and there
were no dissents. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, concurred
separately, as did Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, and
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White. The particular cause of these seriatim opinions among
Justices who all concurred in the result was primarily whether the decision to invalidate a
congressional statute on the basis of minimal property claims undercut other recent precedents,
primarily Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (upholding ban on sale of all artifacts containing
eagle feathers, on theory that the value of the artifacts nevertheless was not entirely destroyed).
81. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987). The decision invalidated the original
version of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Title II, 96 Stat. 2519,
as a taking without just compensation.
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lands in the tribe benefits the members of the Tfibe." But the obvious
benefit to all tribe members was outweighed easily, in the view of the
Justices, by the vital importance of the right of individual holders even of
de minimis property claims "to pass [on] property." 3 All individuals must
be treated alike. The tribal context and the admitted tribal benefit were
obliterated by this abstract equality idea, particularly because something. as
important as property rights was at issue. It is a bitter paradox that the
Court deemed such purported universality much less essential when it was
the custody of children at stake. By contrast, in Mississippi Choctaw the
majority was extremely solicitous of tribal jurisdiction and deferential to
Congress.
As if to underscore the relative unimportance of children in comparison
to property when tribal authority is at issue, a few months later the Court
returned to the vital importance of individual property rights in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation. 4 The Justices
protected the property rights of individual non-members of the tribe at
considerable cost to tribal sovereignty and to historical accuracy.
82. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715. Indeed, Justice O'Connor described the policy of allotment
as "disastrous for the Indians" and noted that the problem of fractionation would continue
to compound over time. Id. at 707.
83. Id. at 711. The statutory section at issue affected only fractional interests that
represented 2 per cent or less of the total acreage of a tract and that had earned the owner
less than $100 the previous year. The Court also acknowledged the headaches involved in
administering tracts subdivided into hundreds of interests, many of which generate only pennies
a year in rent. Yet Justice O'Connor extolled the significance of inheritance as "part of the
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times." Id. at 716. The rights of tribes, and their
members, were no match for longstanding-one might almost say "inherited"-individual
rights; the justices intervened actively to vindicate these individual property rights and refused
to defer to the recent judgment of Congress. Yet the Court returned to a deferential stance
toward the federal government in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 451 (1988). Again writing for the majority, O'Connor conceded that permitting a
road to be built across a sacred Indian site "could have devastating effects on traditional
Indian religious practices." Id. She insisted, however, that the Government remained free to
choose how to use "what is, after all, its land." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). Moreover,
"government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious
needs and desires." Id. at 452.
84. 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989). In this decision, and two consolidated cases, the Supreme
Court split into three camps on the question of whether the Yakima Tribe had exclusive zoning
jurisdiction over property within its reservation in the state of Washington. The decisive duo-
Justice Stevens joined by Justice 0' Connor-used their swing votes to determine that the
tribe could continue to exercise control over a site in what had been the closed area of the
reservation, at least when the owner sought to develop the land in a way that might harm the
environment. But, they determined, the tribe had to cede authority to the local county zoning
process in the case of a parcel held in fee on the more open part of the reservation. A second
group-Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy-
would have deprived the tribe of zoning authority entirely. The third group-Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall-would have given the tribe exclusive authority over all the land at
issue. For a powerful, detailed critique of Brendale, see J. Singer, Sovereignty and Property
(unpublished manuscript) [on file with author].
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What is most striking about the Brendale morass is that the crucial
factor in Stevens' decisive opinion was his belief that it was unthinkable that
individual property holders in fee might be subjected to zoning by a govern-
ment body, i.e., the Yakima Tribe, which they might not be able to join.
Analogous situations that are permitted, such as huge blocks of real estate
owned by foreign nationals, for example, or unaccountable corporate power
in a variety of contemporary contexts, did not trouble Stevens and O'Connor.
In fact, Stevens's opinion underscored the continuing hold of Lockean
notions of individual property on American constitutional law. It also echoed
* Croson's fears about minority political power. Had the justices considered
history, they would have had to deal with the uncontested fact of blatant
treaty violation by the federal government, as well as Congress' explicit
repudiation of the statute upon which the majority relied, the 1887 Dawes
Act, in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. But judicial myopia about
history when Native American rights conflict with the claims of individual
fee holders is itself a tragic old story.s
D. Construction of Racial, Ethnic, and National Groups
Deciding who is a member of a family or a tribe is basic, yet such a
question is never free of difficulty. Moreover, deference to tribal or family
norms, as least as judges perceive such norms to be, may defeat principles
as important as the elimination of gender discrimination.A6 Judicial struggles
to define membership in racial, ethnic, and national groups further illuminate
the dangers of purported neutrality when there are important legal conse-
quences of group identity at stake.
In ironic contrast to the two Patterson opinions discussed above, for
example, the United States Supreme Court decided in 1987 that the same
1866 Civil Rights Act at issue in Patterson may be invoked by Arabs and
Jews to attack alleged discrimination against them. An antic sense of humor
may have informed the Court's decision to consider Saint Francis College
85. For enlightening recent treatment of basic themes concerning the legal history of
Indian tribes, see Williams, supra note 61. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM.
B. FouND. REs. J. 1.
86. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (no implied right of action in
federal court to challenge alleged gender discrimination by tribe); Attorney-General of Canada
v. Lavell; Isaac v. Bedard, 38 DLR (3rd) 481 (1973) (upholding exclusion of Indian women
who married non-members of tribe). But Canada's law allowing revocation of a woman's
Indian status for marrying a non-Indian was said to violate the right to freedom of association,
protected in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Matter of
Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R/24 (July 31, 1981), U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/DR(XIII)
R.6/24, GAOR A/36/40. For a useful discussion of international law in the context of
sovereignty claims by North American Indians, see Note, Toward Consent and Cooperation:
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. Ray. 597 (1987).
For a devastating critique of the decision in Santa Clara Pueblo, including historical information
on that tribe's much more complex treatment of gender, see Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns:
Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. Ray. 671 (1989).
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v. Al-Khazraji" and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb8 together. Prior
decisions had determined clearly that discrimination against whites was
actionable under Sections 1981 and 1982, but now the Court wrestled with
the thorny issue of alleged discrimination based on the plaintiffs' Arab and
Jewish identities respectively.
In Saint Francis College, an Arab professor alleged discrimination when
a Catholic college denied him tenure. The issue, as the Court framed it,
was: "[W]hether a person of Arabian ancestry was protected from racial
discrimination under Sec. 1981."89 Justice White's answer for the unanimous
Court was that it was unnecessary to determine the current racial character-
ization of Arabs9° Instead, White held, "the understanding of 'race' in the
19th century" 9' should be decisive.
The Court sought that understanding primarily through a very brief
survey of 19th century dictionaries and encyclopedias, supplemented by a
smattering of the legislative history of section 1981. Because the mid-19th
century American sources the Court consulted generally defined "race" in
terms of "stock," "lineage," and "ancestry," and because encyclopedias
and Congressmen alike seemed to distinguish "Arabs, Englishmen, Germans
and certain other ethnic groups" from one another as separate races, the
Court claimed "little trouble" in concluding "that Congress intended to
protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected
to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic char-
acteristics."92 While White noted that distinctive physiognomy is not essential
to qualify under Section 1981, he added that if A1-Khazraji had claimed
discrimination based "solely on the place or nation of origin, or his religion,"
the statute would not have protected him.93
After anti-Semitic slogans were sprayed on the walls of a suburban
synagogue, Jewish plaintiffs tried to claim that "Jews are not a racially
87. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
88. 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
89. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 607 (1987). Section 1981 contains
that remnant of the original 1866 Civil Rights Act dealing with contracts that was also at issue
in Patterson. Though the statute does not use the word "race," precedents such as Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) have made it clear that racial discrimination is prohibited
by § 1981 in private as well as public contracts. The Court also dealt in Saint Francis College
with a statute of limitations issue not relevant here.
90. In an important footnote, White criticized popular understanding that there are three
major human races-Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid-from the perspective of modem
biologists and anthropologists. He noted that some but not all scientists have concluded that
"racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature,"
and that "[c]lear-cut categories do not exist." 481 U.S. at 610 n.4.
91. Id. at 610.
92. Id. at 613.
93. Id. The Court thus approved the Court of Appeals holding that being "genetically
part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive subgrouping," id., would be sufficient,
but held such a showing not necessary to establish a discrimination claim under the statute.
Justice Brennan concurred separately and argued that any line separating ancestry and ethnic
characteristics from place or nation of origin could hardly offer a bright line test. Id. at 614.
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distinct group" but that, nevertheless, they ought to be protected as Jews
under Section 1982 because the perpetrators of the spray-painting "viewed
Jews as racially distinct and were motivated by racial prejudice."' ' The
Court refused to thread so fine a needle. Nevertheless, the unanimous Court,
mostly by reference to its treatment of A1-Khazraji's case, held that when
section 1982 was adopted "Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then
considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the
statute. "9
The result, if perhaps not the reasoning, seems right in both these cases.
The 1866 Civil Rights Act did seek to reach "at a minimum," as the Court
of Appeals put it, "discrimination directed against an individual because he
or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive
sub-grouping of homo sapiens."' ' Yet the Court's reliance on selections from
a few dictionaries and encyclopedias is glib, an example of the methodology
of law-office history. Moreover, even the few snippets from the congressional
debates illustrate the implausibility of the distinction White tried to draw
between discrimination based on racial or ethnic characteristics on the one
face and discrimination based on place or nation of origin on the other.Y
The malleability of these categories is further underscored by their subsequent
history. Nevertheless, there is obviously still weight in calling Jews a race,
for example, and it is a variable weight that depends on the perspective of
the identifier as well as those identified.9 s To ignore the baggage of that
history is both insular and woefully unrealistic.
94. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616 (1987). Justice White again
wrote for the unanimous Court.
95. Id. at 617-18.
96. 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986), quoted with approval. Saint Francis College, 481
U.S. at 607. For historical sources that support the important point that this statement describes
only the bare minimum of the coverage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, see supra, note 51.
97. Thus, White relied on comments made by Representative Bingham when the 1866
Act was repassed in 1870. Bingham claimed that the Act provided "that the States shall not
hereafter discriminate against the immigrant from China and in favor of the immigrant from
Prussia, nor against the immigrant from France and in favor of the immigrant from Ireland."
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3871 (1870). Precisely the examples White used by way of
illustration-as well as many others he might have invoked, particularly a favorite reference
of the time to discrimination against "Celtic Irishmen"-undercut the distinction White
advanced in Saint Francis.
98. In summarizing recent studies of Southerners, for example, the distinguished historian
C. Vann Woodward recently wrote, "Whites identify themselves with the South more than
Catholics with their religion, more than union members with other unionists, and at about the
same levels as blacks and Jews with other members of their race [sic]." N.Y. Rev. of Books,
Oct. 26, 1989, at 13, 16. A much-publicized historical example occurred in a colloquy between
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Julian Mack before the United States Immigration Commission
in 1909. Mack was appalled when Senator Lodge, citing Cyrus Adler, referred to "the Jewish
race." Mack responded, "I do not recognize the Jewish race." Quoted in Ch. 13, What Is a
Jew?, in H. BARNARD, Tim FORGING OF THE AMmRmCAN JEW: THE LIFE AND Tmrs OF JUDGE
JULAN W. MACK 93-100 (1974). Mack had a distinguished career as chief lieutenant to Louis
D. Brandeis in the Zionist cause and as a federal judge; somewhat ironically, Mack headed
the separate Committee of Jewish Delegates in Versailles in 1919. Like Brandeis, Mack had
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E. An English Coda
It is a commonplace that people in the United States "are a people of
the present, and have no heartfelt interest in the olden time."9' Perhaps it
is not surprising to find that judges in the United States pay little attention
to history. At first glance, it may be more surprising to find judges in
England, a country that sometimes appears overladen with history, appar-
ently similarly unaware of a checkered past. For example, Lord Denning,
long Master of the Rolls and surely one of the most distinguished English
judges of his era, revealed naivete about various group histories similar to
that of his American counterparts, at least in cases about "involuntary
associations."
Lord Denning's well-known opinion in Mandla v. Dowell Lee0" may
be read as a counterpart to the American decisions just discussed. The
Mandla opinion further illustrates the importance of looking up from one's
dictionary to contemplate the context of the past. This is not to suggest
that the general legal question involved, nor the specific case before Lord
Denning, made for an easy Dworkinian case. But sensitivity to group
histories might avoid drawing particularly embarrassing analogies, as did
Lord Denning.
The Mandla case arose when a Sikh solicitor tried to enroll his son in
the Park Grove School. He was told by the headmaster that his son could
not be enrolled unless the boy removed his turban and cut his hair, both
acts forbidden by orthodox Sikh belief. 10 The issue before the Court of
Appeal was: "[W]hat is a 'racial group' within the Race Relations Act of
1976?" 1°2 Because the Act clearly did not cover discrimination based on
religion, politics or culture, Lord Denning reduced the issue to whether
Sikhs ought to be considered a group "defined by reference to ethnic
come to believe in hyphenated American Judaism. As Harold Laski observed in 1916, however,
"Whether we will or no, we are bundles of hyphens. When the central linkages conflict, a
choice must be made." Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARv. L. REv. 404, 425
(1916).
99. Nathaniel Hawthorne, "Alice Doane's Appeal," quoted in H. HENDERSON, VERSIONs
OF Tm PAST: THE HisTORicAL IMAGINATION IN AMERIcAN FIcToN 92 (1974).
100. [1982] 3 All E.R. 1108, rev'd, [1983] 1 All E.R. 1062.
101. The headmaster's position was that he had not rejected the boy because he was a
Sikh. There were already several Sikhs in the school, for one thing, and "lilt was the turban
that was rejected." Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1982] 3 All E.R. 1108, 1111.
102. Id. The 1976 Act, § 3(l) defined "racial group" as "group of persons defined by
reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins." Lord Denning noted that
everything turned on the issue of whether Sikhs are a racial group, since discrimination in
education is prohibited under the Act whether it is direct or indirect. Lord Kerr found it a
"difficult and troubling case." Id. at 1118. He also engaged in etymological research and
explained that the 1976 Act included protection from discrimination based on "nationality"
after the House of Lords had decided that "national origins" was not to be equated with
"nationality" in London Borough of Ealing v. Race Relations Board, [1972] 1 All E.R. 105.
Lord Kerr determined, however, that Sikhs are "only distinctive because they adhere to distinct
religious, political or social beliefs and customs," Mandla, [1982] 3 All E.R. at 1122, and are
therefore not within the protection of the Act.
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origins." He then took up the meaning of "ethnic" with a display of
erudition about its Greek origin and its use in the translation of the Old
Testament from Hebrew. He traced development of "ethnic" from meaning
a "non-Israelitish" nation to "not Christian or Jewish" to the "entirely
different meaning" noted in the 1934 Concise Oxford Dictionary.03 Lord
Denning embraced the 1934 Concise Oxford Dictionary's meaning because,
he explained, "That is the meaning which I, acquiring my vocabulary in
1934, have always attached to the word 'ethnic. ')))1 4
This sounded solipsistic. But Lord Denning went on to acknowledge
that new meanings have been given "ethnic" since 1934. In the second
supplement of the Oxford English Dictionary, he found a reference to a
source which, in turn, referred to "Jews" as the "best-known example" of
ethnic grouping.'05 This led to a curious excursion. Lord Denning sought
support for his notion that it is "a racial characteristic" that distinguishes
Jews from non-Jews. He capped his analogy by saying: "There must be no
discrimination against Jews in England. Anti-Semitism must not be allowed.
It has produced great evils elsewhere. It must not be allowed here."'' '
Unfortunately, the ahistorical implication of this otherwise noble declaration
seems to be that anti-Semitism had not been a problem in England's past.
After all, Lord Denning asserted, "There is nothing in their culture of
language or literature to mark out Jews in England from others. The Jews
in England share all of these characteristics equally with the rest of us.
Apart from religion, the one characteristic which is different is a racial
characteristic."'0 This awkward use of we/they belies the claim that neither
103. Mandla, [1982] 3 All E.R. at 1111.
104. Id. This quite remarkable statement specifying the year in which he acquired his
vocabulary not surprisingly led to the further statement that "It is, to my mind, the correct
meaning." That correct meaning was "pertaining to race." Id.
105. Id. at 1112. Lord Denning was justly famous for his iconoclasm about legal precedent.
Yet this formalistic hop from sourcebook to sourcebook is reminiscent of the scene in the
Marx Brothers' movie, "Day at the Races," in which Groucho learns that every thick racing
tout he buys from Chico only leads to another book-and Groucho winds up selling tootsie-
fruitsie ice cream from Chico's cart.
106. Id. at 1113.
107. Id. at 1112. It may be that Lord Denning, always something of a judicial maverick,
was becoming increasingly insensitive to claims by minorities while he continued as Master of
the Rolls into his 80s. Lord Denning finally resigned amidst controversy over allegedly racist
statements in a book he had published. But there is considerable evidence that Lord Denning
had been quite insensitive to claims by members of groups he considered different for a
considerable time. For a balanced but critical view, see Palley, Lord Denning and Human
Rights-Reassertion of the Right to Justice, in LoRD DENNING: THE JUDGE AND THE LAW (J.L.
Jowell & J.P.W.B. McAuslan eds. 1984). Moreover, Lord Denning's oft-repeated admiration
for "the Christian religion, his native country, and the defence forces and police," Heuston,
Lord Denning: The Man and his Times, id. at 19 (citations omitted) often left him apparently
unaware of different perspectives. Lest it be thought I have concentrated on an unimportant
viewpoint, however, Lord Scarman spoke for many when, in 1977, he declared that the legal
history of the previous 25 years would never be forgotten as "the age of legal aid, law
reform-and Lord Denning," The Times, special report supplement page II col.1, January 5,
1977, quoted (perhaps immodestly) in LoRD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 315 (1979), as
well as by many others.
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past history nor legal distinctions are still relevant. When Lord Denning
turned to the Sikhs, he found them distinct neither racially nor physically
from other Indian peoples, so it was plain to him that Sikhs are distinguished
only by their religion and culture, categories not covered by the Act. 08
On appeal, the House of Lords reversed. In particular, Lord Fraser of
Tullybelton criticized Lord Denning not only for the result he reached but
also for his view of the Commission and even for his Greek etymology. 1°9
Lord Fraser argued that while dictionaries might be helpful, they were of
greatest use in demonstrating that "ethnic has come to be commonly used
in a sense appreciably wider than the strictly racial or biological.","0 As
had a New Zealand decision, Lord Fraser emphasized history, specifically
a group's "particular historical identity" and its members' "belief as to
their historical antecedents.""' He said it ought to make no difference
whether someone entered such a group by birth or.by adherence. Moreover,
Lord Fraser read the Act to reject both the headmaster's justifications of
his school uniform rule and his argument that, because a Sikh physically
could comply with the regulation, it ought not be considered discrimina-
tory."2 For all his open-mindedness, however, Lord Fraser relied on a
108. Sikhs may be a distinct community, he noted, "But that is not good enough. It does
not enable them to complain of discrimination against them." Mandla, [1982] 3 All E.R. at
1114. After all, Lord Denning explained, "You must remember that it is perfectly lawful to
discriminate against groups of people to whom you object, so long as they are not a racial
group" such as permissible discrimination against "the Moonies or the skinheads." Id. Though
he claimed Sikhs are different, in that they are "a fine community upholding the highest
standards," id., the principle permits discrimination against them as well. Lord Denning also
took the opportunity in this, his last judgment before retiring, to scold the Commission for
Racial Equality for interfering with the headmaster's difficult job. Id. at 1114-15. Concurring,
Lord Oliver went even further in scolding the Commission for its use of machinery designed
to protect the weak "as an engine of oppression" against the headmaster, id. at 1118; Lord
Kerr described the Commission's interview with the headmaster as "more like an inquisition
than an interview" and as "harassment of the headmaster." Id. at 1123.
109. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1062. Lords Edmund-Davies, Roskill, and Brandon of Oakbrook
all briefly noted their agreement with Lord Fraser; Lord Templeman wrote at greater length
to explain why, "in view of the history of this country since the 1939-45 war I find it
impossible to believe that Parliament intended to exclude the Sikhs from the benefit of the
Race Relations Act 1976." Id. at 1071. He concluded that Sikhs possess "some of the
characteristics of a race, namely group descent, a group of geographical origin and a group
history." Id. at 1072.
110. Id. at 1062, 1066. It is noteworthy that Lord Fraser's useful list of criteria to define
an ethnic group began with "a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as
distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive," and added "a
cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not
necessarily associated with religious observance" as the other essential criterion. Lord Fraser
provided five additional relevant, but not essential, criteria. Id. at 1067.
111. Id. at 1068, quoting King-Ansell v. Police [1979], 2 N.Z.L.R. 531,542-43 (Richardson
J.) (holding that Jews constituted a group protected under § 25 of the New Zealand Race
Relations Act of 1971, which forbade group incitement on the ground of "colour, race, or
ethnic or national origins").
112. Lord Fraser expressed "much sympathy" with the headmaster's principal justificatory
argument that he "sought to run a Christian school," but still found this claim impossible to
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curious non-sequitur to explain Parliament's intention. He argued, "[I]t is
inconceivable that Parliament would have legislated against racial discrimi-
nation intending that the protection should not apply either to Christians
or (above all) to Jews."" 3 This argument blatantly proves too much: either
discrimination on religious grounds must be covered, although all conceded
that religious discrimination was not prohibited by the statute, or Christians
and Jews are (analogous) ethnic or racial groups. The tangled history of
English anti-Semitism and of conflicted Anglo-Jewish identity threatens Lord
Fraser's fine effort to consider both the objective and subjective aspects of
the history of the Sikhs." 4
Nevertheless, Lord Fraser's opinion contrasts quite starkly with the
narrow perceptions of his judicial counterparts in the United States. It is
probably not discreet to mention other English decisions, old and new, that
seem closer to the insularity of the American judges, but several important
examples are worthy of note here.115 Moreover, any consideration of judicial
sustain because it would be inconsistent with the Act's prohibition of discrimination based on
ethnic origin. Id. at 1070. Lord Fraser also explained that while a Sikh obviously was physically
able to remove his turban, and thus might come within the Act's "can comply" baseline for
determining that there was no discrimination, he read "can comply" not literally but rather
to mean "can consistently with the customs and cultural conditions of the ... group." Id.
at 1069, citing Price v. Civil Service Commission [1978] 1 All E.R. 1228.
113. Mandla, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1065.
114. Two separate difficulties stand out. First, as Lord Simon of Glaisdale noted in
Borough of Ealing v. Race Relations Board, [1972] 1 All E.R. 105, 114-15, "There have been
periods in our history which have been disgraced by acute xenophobia" (examples omitted);
now Parliament had responded with "rubbery and elusive language-understandably when the
draftsman is dealing with so unprecise a concept as 'race' in its popular sense and endeavouring
to leave no loophole for evasion." (It is worth noting that Lord Simon joined in holding that
"national origins" in the 1968 Race Relations Act did not include discrimination based on
"nationality," and Parliament responded by including both categories in the 1976 Race
Relations Act.) Id. It is unlikely that, in the face of the omission of religious discrimination
from the statute's coverage, Parliament intended to prohibit all discrimination against Jews
or, for that matter, against some Christians by other Christians or by other groups. Second,
Lord Fraser seemed simply to assume that English Jews wish to be considered separate, in
ways akin to separate racial or ethnic classifications. But there is a long tradition to the
contrary.
115. A recent constitutional law book put the matter succinctly: "Only in exceptional
circumstances did the common law provide protection for members of minority groups."
E.L.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CoNsnrrrimoNAL AND ADMnmNsTRATrvE LAw 574 (10th ed.
1985). And Parliament was hardly more tolerant. See generally C. Rom, A HsTORY oF THE
JEws ns ENoLAND (3d ed. 1964). After Cromwell allowed the Jews legally to return to England,
for example, Jews continued to be legally excluded from all public life and all universities for
two centuries. Moreover, anti-semitism may be simultaneously rampant and genteel. Cf. Laski,
Notes on the Strict Interpretation of Ecclesiastical Trusts, 36 CANADIAN L. TImas 190, 193
(1916) (cy pres applying trust for support of Jewish yeshiva to support of Anglican school).
Even some recent decisions suggest limited toleration of distinctly different groups, see e.g.,
R. v. Lemon, [1979] 1 All E.R. 898 (upholding conviction of editor and publisher of Gay
News for blasphemous libel when they "yilify Christ in His life and crucifixion"-disagreement
only over holding that specific intent need not be proved and argument by Lord Scarman that
blasphemy "is not sufficiently comprehensive" and ought no longer to be "shackled by the
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responses to group claims in the context of Northern Ireland darkens the
picture considerably. With such notable exceptions, however, the famously
insular English judges seem a bit more attuned today to the historic bases
of ethnic and racial group claims than do their contemporaries on the
United States Supreme Court, though considerably less so when religious
claims are raised.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has pushed free
exercise of religion claims in seemingly opposite directions. The Court is
unsympathetic to attacks on conditions imposed for government benefits
that conflict with the religious beliefs of members of discrete and insular
groups. 16 Yet the Court emphasized that Illinois violated an individual's
Free Exercise right when it denied him unemployment compensation "re-
gardless of whether the individual's refusal to work on Sunday is in response
to the command of a particular religious sect. 11 7 Sincere religious belief
by an individual was the only touchstone, according to the unanimous
Court. The trend toward uniformity, which includes rejection of free exercise
claims rooted in longstanding religious group beliefs, contrasts sharply with
respect for an entirely individualistic religious claim in Frazee. Together,
these decisions suggest another way in which the contemporary American
legal climate is losing sympathy with group identification. In the modern
welfare state, in which government programs serve as invaluable sources of
both wealth and status, purportedly neutral policies that actually impinge
on the group identifications of distinct and insular minority groups deserve
special judicial scrutiny.
F. "To Know... What We See"
During the early days of the Gilded Age, Justice Stephen Field had to
decide whether it was constitutional for San Francisco's sheriff to cut the
chains of history" to protect only Christian religion. (This decision was upheld by the European
Commission on Human Rights, Gay News Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 123 (1982));
Ostreicher v. Secretary of State for the Environment, [1979] 37 P.& C.R. 9 (C.A.) (refusing
to quash compulsory purchase order though hearing held on Jewish holiday when applicant
alleged she could neither work nor hire another to work for her); Ahmad v. Inner London
Education Authority, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 396 (Muslim not allowed to make arrangements for
time off from teaching duties for religious worship).
116. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), for example, the Court rejected a Native
American father's claim that to be required to furnish a social security number for his
daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, as a condition of receiving federal aid and food stamps
conflicted with his family's religious beliefs. See also Employment Division, Oregon Dept. of
Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (proclaiming new, strong presumption in
favor of laws of general applicability even if they seriously interfere with basic religious
practices, such as ritual use of peyote by members of the Native American Church). Cf. Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n; 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Orthodox Jew could be forbidden to wear yarmulke during military
service).
117. Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989). Justice
White wrote the brief, unanimous opinion.
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hair of all prisoners within an inch of their scalps. This equal haircut rule
was not challenged by crypto-Hippies, but by Chinese prisoners. If Field
generally embraced formal judicial principles and free competition with an
enthusiasm (and inconsistency) similar to that of current Justices, he nev-
ertheless invalidated the rule, stating: "When we take our seats on the
bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges
what we see as men."" 8
Consideration of "a fact in its history"" 9 convinced Field that San
Francisco had targeted Chinese prisoners. Sheriff Nunan cut off the queues
that the Chinese considered sacred. Field held this "altogether dispropor-
tionate" suffering unconstitutional. 20 Justice Field thus was a pioneer in
recognizing prisoners' rights, but his opinion is important beyond the anti-
Chinese motives he perceived behind the neutral mask of equality.'2' It
illustrates why there must be judicial willingness to grasp "a fact in its
history" in dealing with minority groups. That sensitivity includes cognizance
of discrimination in the guise of evenhandedness as well as more overt
bigotry.
Yet, in contrast, the modern tales we considered are full of self-satisfied
legal abstractions. They lack specifics about diverse people and traditions
that give rise to group exceptionalism. These contemporary judicial narra-
tives reflect and produce Whiggish law. Any complexity, and certainly any
bleakness, that might contradict the happy endings the judges conclusively
118. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (No. 6,546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879). For
Field's views generally, see C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. Fml: CRAFrSmAN OF THE LAW (1930);
McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Par-
ameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HisT. 970 (1975).
119. 12 Fed. Cas. at 255. Justice Field's realistic approach was echoed directly in Justice
Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Harlan attacked the idea
that separate railroad facilities might be equal, because "Every one knows" that the statute's
primary purpose was discrimination, thereby violating the principle that "Our Constitution is
color-blind." Id. at 557, 559. That realistic perception by judges is often problematic, however,
is suggested by Harlan's assertions elsewhere in this dissent that the white race was and would
remain superior in fact. Moreover, in Plessy, an aged Justice Field joined in Justice Brown's
infamous majority opinion.
120. 12 F. Cas. at 256-57. Justice Field, sitting as a single justice, actually based his
decision on the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment,"
without indicating any concern about how it might apply to state, rather than federal, action.
To illustrate further how laws "general in their terms, would operate only upon a special
class, or upon a class, with exceptional severity," and thus would be unconstitutional, Field
mentioned "the large number of Jews" in San Francisco, "a highly intellectual race ...
generally obedient to the laws of the country." Id. at 255. He suggested that should there be
Jewish prisoners, their "peculiar opinions with respect to the use of certain articles of food"
would make it unconstitutional to impose the same prison diet of pork upon them as might
be imposed on everyone else.
121. The Court's most famous statement about unconstitutional discriminatory motive
occurred a few years later in another case of the discriminatory application of law to Chinese
aliens in San Francisco, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (if law "fair on
its face and impartial in appearance ... is applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand," it is unconstitutional).
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presume would be upsetting. To consider that past wrongs may be visited
upon current group members would sap teleological faith in the neutral,
even-handed principles of the current legal system. Therefore, contemporary
judges must squelch particularized historical arguments. This may be crucial
because, as William Wiecek put it, "oppressed peoples have an acute sense
of their past ... they must: it is the crucible of their identity and their
cohesion. Without it their present oppression becomes either meaningless or
natural. ' 122
CONCLUSION
Tragic history cannot be trump in every legal contest. But the quest for
a single level on which everyone is similarly situated sacrifices the diverse
history of groups for abstractions about deracinated individuals who float
equally above reality. Yet we have not reached once upon a time. Even
when judges declare it, they cannot so easily purge the past.
The traditions and historical sense of different groups are part of "the
factual surround of legal arrangements." 12 Footnote four's suggestion of
special scrutiny for claims of discrete and insular minorities never flourished
fully. Today, however, we lose sight of the clashing norms that are anchored
in groups. Sentimental haze obscures history. Judges pave over the shards
of the past. As they do so, these judges proclaim that they are merely doing
a bit of groundskeeping on a lovely, smooth, and level playing field open
to all.
Despite a few success stories, group differences still count.'2 Yet in
Patterson, Croson, and Hodel v. Irving, for example, the Court intervened
to invalidate efforts by popularly-elected bodies to remedy past wrongs
perpetrated against paradigmatic discrete and insular minorities. Moreover,
judicial struggles to define membership in families and tribes, and in racial
or ethnic groups, underscore how aggressive judges have become in con-
structing the problematic group categories they prefer to consider natural,
almost Platonic, essences.
The decisions we considered are particularly dismaying because judges
actually may be able to help legitimate ideals not otherwise widely ac-
122. Wiecek, Preface: The Historical Race Relations Symposium, 17 RuTroas L.J. 407,
412 (1986). Or as Renan noted a century ago, "[P]eoplehood is cemented by shared memories
of common suffering," quoted in Dinstein, Collective Human Rights, supra note 3, at 103.
For a forceful elaboration in the context of descendants of slaves in the United States, see
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideal from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HAzv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
123. Galanter, Review Essay: Outside, Inside: Jewish Justices in the Homeless Society,
14 LAw & SOCIMA INQUIRY 507, 522 (1989) (discussing C. Wright Mills's sense of "sociological
imagination").
124. See generally Minow, supra note 59; W.G. S-mNEm, FoLKwAys 12-13 (1906). The
decisions discussed above may demonstrate that "it is a happy faculty of the mind to slough
that which conscience refuses to assimilate." W. FAULKNER, Li anr IN AUGUST 376 (1932, pap.
ed. 1987).
19911
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 48:381
cepted.' 5 Instead, the Anglo-American judicial treatment of involuntary
groups today seems to have little doubt about a unified, homogenized
past.126 Neutral rules crisscross with presumed equality. There is no iron,
only velvet, as pleasant abstractions beyond history stretch back to a golden
time immemorial.
It is important, Yoram Dinstein suggested, when we deal with human
rights, that we make the effort "to climb down to earth."' 2 7 If particularism
is to be the foundation for Jacob's Ladder, however, an entirely ad hoc
approach might bury us in lawless waves of sand.'2 Legal actors must
consider similarities and differences between group experiences if we are to
produce thoughtful decisions in cases that arise from particular contexts.
Therefore, a few normative suggestions for judicial treatment of minority
rights may be in order:
(1) Judges scrupulously must scrutinize both public and private actions
or omissions that directly harm or stigmatize members of traditionally
victimized groups. Legitimacy ought not to be presumed in actions-or even
failures to act-that are directed at members of those involuntary groups
who have been made scapegoats repeatedly in the past.
(2) Proof of biased motivation for acts against members of such groups
must be sufficient, but not necessary, to allege discrimination. For example,
Section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act 2 9 includes a group mens rea concept.
That provision does not require explicit proof of a discriminatory motive
in a denial of equality, but it allows judges or juries to infer discriminatory
motive in the way that Anglo-American law generally allows such inferences
to be drawn. This approach is consistent with the statute's history; it also
parallels the trend toward a focus on group liability in other legal areas. 30
125. For the most recent study and collection of empirical work on the ability of courts
in the United States to elicit acceptance of public policies unpopular with the mass public, see
Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political
Tolerance, 23 LAw & SocarY REv. 469 (1989).
126. In contrast to the ahistoricism we have considered, immediately after the Civil War,
the United States Supreme Court insisted, "[W]e cannot shut our eyes to the public history."
Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 97, 104 (1866). Chief Justice Chase hardly seemed
concerned about neutrality when his opinion for a unanimous Court argued that judicial notice
of public history was particularly appropriate because the future of "vast mining interests...
contributing largely to the prosperity and improvement of the whole country," id., turned on
the question.
127. This was part of Dinstein's explanation for initiating publication of the Israeli
Yearbook of Human Rights, IS. YBK. Hum. Rrs. 14 (1971). Such realism seems particularly
appropriate for academic critics tottering in easy chairs as we watch the fray.
128. "He who clings to a law does not fear the judgment that reinstates him in an order
he believes in. But the keenest of human torments is to be judged without a law." A. C~AMUs,
THE FAm 117 (J. O'Brien trans. 1956).
129. Discussed above in the context of the two Patterson decisions and the decisions in
Saint Francis College and Shaare Tefilla Synagogue, supra at notes 49-51 and accompanying
text, 87-97 and accompanying text.
130. This trend is evident in disparate legal realms such as criminal law, torts, and even
the first amendment. See, e.g., Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence,
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(3) At times, judges may have to seek evidence on "subjective" ideas
about the identity of a particular involuntary group, including who is in
and who is out of the group. Discerning group wishes is always difficult.
Yet to ignore a collectivity's perceptions-and the question of whether an
individual is, or perceives herself to be, part of the collectivity-is to hide
behind the false universalism of conclusive presumptions.' 3 1 Group history
may play a crucial role in such an inquiry.
None of these approaches seems likely to gain wide judicial acceptance
any time soon. Myriad minority groups undoubtedly will survive and even
thrive no matter what judges say. Group identities free and fetter what we
are and what we can become. Perceptions of diverse histories will help
sustain these groups as they struggle to overcome inertia, legal precedents,
or worse. Nevertheless, consideration of history and context is crucial for
judges, too. Attention to history would make the job of judges more
complex. They will find no single objective historical account.1 2 But heeding
history is surely different from invoking a single tradition. Despite recent
judicial claims to discern such a tradition, to be invoked as a definitive
source that channels judicial choice, history unavoidably complicates the
picture. 3 No matter what judges assert, history encompasses many tradi-
tions. Moreover, neither history nor tradition is the same thing as invention.
Nor are they synonymous with the creation of an appealingly simple and
recyclable, but fundamentally ahistorical, past.34
Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1983); Rabin, The Historical
Development of the Fault Principle: "4 Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981); Board of
Education, Island Trees v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion focus on group's
motivation for removal of books from public school library).
131. See, e.g., M. Minow, supra, note 59; J. CLIFORD, TEa PREDICAMETr OF CULTuRE
(1988); Getman, Voices, and Yudof, 'Tea at the Palaz of Hoon" The Human Voice in Legal
Rules, 66 TEx. L. REv. 577, 589 (1988); Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
132. This is true even when judges allow professional historians to testify as expert
witnesses. For a fine study of the ebb and flow of attempts by American historians to achieve
objectivity, see P. NoVIcK, THAT NoELE DREAM: Tan 'OrcnvrrIY QUESTION' AND THE
AMEUAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988). See generally, The Alliance of Law and History in
J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF Tmu LAW: CAMwozo, HOLMEs, JEFFERsoN AND WYTHE As
MAxERs OF ma MAsm 152-67 (1976).
133. Justice Scalia repeatedly has led a search party for a one-dimensional tradition, a
single tradition itself capable of deciding constitutional questions. For the latest restatement
of his efforts, see, e.g., Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046-
47 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment, on grounds that, because awarding punitive
damages accords with "tradition," the practice cannot violate due process). Thus far, this
snipe-hunt to make tradition and due process synonymous has not commanded a majority of
the Court, but it is an only somewhat relaxed version of Scalia's insistent invocation of
tradition that already has prevailed in decisions such as Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
192, 194 (1986) and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,
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Carl Becker, a great historian famous for his relativism, once stated,
"Let us then admit that there are two histories: the actual series of events
that once occurred; and the ideal series that we affirm and hold in mem-
ory." ' Nonetheless, as Becker put it, the effort must be made to make
these two historical series correspond as nearly as possible. "One of the
first duties of man is not to be duped," Becker asserted, "to be aware of
his world.' 3 6 But historical facts do not speak for themselves. Everypersons,
and particularly those who wield authority along with their opinions, should
listen for full choruses of social memory. A monochromatic tone-even
when it is denoted "legal tradition"-may temporarily overwhelm multiple
remembrances of the past. But even drowning out cannot be stable. Nor is
it likely to suppress for long the diverse senses of collective history that are
essential to those groups who historically have been made-and use history
to make themselves-discrete and insular minorities.
Judicial awareness of historic diversity transcends abstract theory. It
calls for becoming comfortable with choices on a continuum, for judicial
wisdom beyond a purportedly neutral decision that is compelled somehow
by what is alleged to be traditional. The nitty-gritty, earthbound quest to
'do equal right' depends on awareness of historic contexts. Complex, dark,
even harrowing histories of discrete groups ought not to be ignored. Their
stories remind us that "The key to redemption is remembrance." 13
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(1969) (reasons given for decisions take on life of their own; Supreme Court the institution
most concerned with relating past, present, and future in American life, albeit not bound by
history).
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234 (1935).
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137. This statement by the Baal Shem Toy is used as the motto of Yad Vashem, the
Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem.
